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ABSTRACT
Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) were originally intended for interplanetary com-
munications and have been applied to a series of difficult environments: wireless sensor
networks, unmanned aerial vehicles, and short-range personal communications. There is a
class of such environments in which nodes follow semi-predictable social patterns, such as
wildlife tracking or personal devices. This work introduces a series of algorithms designed
to identify the social patterns present in these environments and apply this data to difficult
problems, such as efficient message routing and content distribution.
Security is also difficult in a mobile environment. This is especially the case in the
event that a large portion of the network is unreliable, or simply unknown. As the net-
work size increases nodes have difficulty in securely distributing keys, especially using
low powered nodes with limited keyspace. A series of multi-party security algorithms
were designed to securely transmit a message in the event that the sender does not have ac-
cess to the destinations public key. Messages are routed through a series of nodes, each of
which partially decrypts the message. By encrypting for several proxies, the message can
only be intercepted if all those nodes have been compromised. Even a highly compromised
network has increased security using this algorithm, with a trade-off of reduced delivery
ratio and increased delivery time.
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1. INTRODUCTION
When routing messages through a Delay Tolerant Network (DTN), efficient routing
techniques utilize environmental information for efficiency and speed. In a social environ-
ment (e.g. human carried devices), nodes follow semi-predictable patterns based on the
social context. It is possible augment message routing in a DTN by based message routes
on this social behavior. Furthermore, security in a DTN is difficult to implement. Without
access to a trusted third party capable of verifying a device or its key data, the trust between
devices is limited to direct contact. While there are methods for verifying identity, ranging
from timing analysis to mundane physical contact [1] [2], these methods only work in direct
contact. Thus, the security information, especially the public key, can only be transmitted
to a device while in direct contact. Even with these limitations, messages can be sent in a
compromised network with high confidentiality.
Consider a global conference of researchers. Several of the researchers have met
before and they tend to form groups that encounter each other frequently. An organizer
gathering data from these users may identify the social groups formed, using the Dynamic
Social Grouping algorithm to efficiently collect such information as participation surveys
or menu selections. Another user with access to similar group information may want to
send a message quickly and efficiently to another researcher at the conference. Rather
than simply hold the message until they come into contact again, he can forward the mes-
sage to a group the recipient is participating in by using the Dynamic Social Grouping -
Node to Node algorithm. If the message is intended to be private, sending the message
through the network is risky. As a new contact, the sender does not have the destination’s
public key, and requesting the key from nearby nodes is hazardous. While he could en-
crypt the message for and trust the proxy to encrypt the message for the final destination,
the proxy then has access to the plaintext of the message. A more secure alternative is
2to implement Three Point Encryption by sending the message through a series of mid-
points.
The first paper introduced is the basis for Dynamic Social Grouping (DSG), a rout-
ing algorithm originally designed for wildlife data collection. Presented in Section 2.4.2,
this protocol uses information about the social dynamics of the nodes to efficiently route
collected information to a basestation. DSG begins with the assumption that the nodes are
being carried by humans or animals that follow certain social patterns. The nodes consis-
tently encounter members of the groups in which they participate. The nodes first identify
the contact strength with other nodes and form small groups when two devices are strongly
connected. These small groups identify potential group merges, creating larger groups that
accurately reflect the environment. The protocol then uses this group data to identify which
nodes and groups have a high probability of quickly delivering a message to a basestation.
The algorithm was tested using real-world data collected from the IEEE Infocom confer-
ence, in which participants were asked to carry devices for 3 to 4 days to measure their
contact patterns. The contact data was used by a simulation to reveal that using the group
data could deliver messages very close to optimal levels at greatly reduced energy and
bandwidth consumption, compared to Epidemic and Probabilistic routing.
With the previous algorithm demonstrating that using social data could improve the
efficiency of node-to-basestation routing, the next step was to expand on the algorithm
to implement node-to-node routing. The algorithm was modified for inexpensive human
communications over a DTN. The DSG - Node to Node algorithm (DSG-N2) presented in
Section II identifies consistent contacts of a node and expands on the group merge logic.
This paper expands upon the routing algorithm in order to allow users to send messages
directly to other users, rather than to a basestation. This objective requires awareness of
individual nodes’ contact patterns, complicating the routing procedure significantly. To
prevent multicollinearity and provide a better proof of concept, a longer dataset provided
by the MIT Reality Project was used. The simulation results demonstrated that the node-
3to-node routing problem could also be addressed using social group data with high effi-
ciency.
Having confirmed the advantages of routing using social dynamics, advances on the
routing algorithms were considered. When the social groups are formed and identified,
alternate methods of using that information to route messages effectively were considered.
Previously the Performance Based Probability was used. This based the nodes’ estimated
probability of delivering a message on their performance with previous messages. It is
also possible to base probability on the contact patterns, tracking which nodes come into
contact frequently. This method, called Contact Based Probability, is capable of delivering
messages faster and more reliably, but at a cost of higher message traffic as messages
follow indirect contacts to be delivered. Another method routes the message to the nearest
group containing the destination, then floods the message among the group members. This
method uses replication in parts of the network nearby the destination, as measured by
contact frequency, to ensure rapid message delivery. These modifications to the social
routing algorithms were presented in Section III.
Section IV addresses security in a DTN. Security is made more difficult by limited
resources, intermittent communications, and easily monitored signals. While cryptography
allows secure communications when given a known key, it is difficult for devices in a large-
scale DTN to securely share keys with each other without direct contact. For this reason,
the Three-Point Encryption algorithm was designed to secure messages without direct ac-
cess to the destination’s key. This algorithm is designed to function in a a compromised
network. Messages are routed through a series of proxies. Each proxy partially decrypts
the message, resulting in a message being compromised only if all proxies are compro-
mised. Chaining and Fragmenting are the two applications of Three Point Encryption. The
Chaining algorithm sends the message through the proxies in sequence, resulting in longer
delivery times and higher security. However, the Fragmenting algorithm separates the mes-
sage into distinct sections, sending each fragment of the key in parallel, allowing the final
4node to decrypt the message only once a certain subset have been received. This results in
a higher delivery ratio - But, if the adversary has compromised enough of the network, the
adversary can read the messages as well, resulting in lower security. Both processes have
trade-offs, but both work to improve security in a difficult environment.
Social context data is applicable to the problem of content distribution, as addressed
in Section V. In a Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET), nodes can attempt to dynamically
distribute relevant files, such as advertising, media, or news articles. To conserve commu-
nication resources, nodes can be appointed as mobile data repositories, also called throw-
boxes. A node in such an environment can retrieve data from a repository, rather than
the original data source. The optimal selection of nodes to act as repositories can be aug-
mented by identifying the social groups in the environment, based on the supposition that
socially similar nodes will have similar data interests. The Social Content Distribution
(SCD) schema identifies social groups, uses the group data to identify which nodes are
likely to request data items, and uses this information to position the mobile repositories.
52. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. PRELIMINARIES
The DTN is a networking architecture characterized by long delays in message trans-
missions [3]. These delays may be caused by disconnected networks, high disruption rate,
or low bandwidth between devices. Also called Disruption Tolerant Networks, the Bundle
Protocol is used by grouping a message into a single unit called a bundle. This bundle con-
tains contains all of the information needed to deliver the message to its destination. These
bundles are stored in a device’s message buffer to be transmitted when the device either
comes into contact with the destination or with another node that is more capable of deliv-
ering the message. This store-and-forward method allows a message to make incremental
steps toward successful delivery, coming closer to delivery with each transmission. Differ-
ent routing algorithms use different metrics to determine which devices are more capable
of delivery; in general, each algorithm is designed for a specific environment of devices.
A subset of DTNs are Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) (these terms are some-
times used interchangeably). These networks consist of several devices (a portion of which
are mobile) and must organize themselves to deliver messages successfully [4]. The mobil-
ity patterns used by the nodes can vary from random mobility (oceanic probes), scheduled
patterns (e.g bus schedules), bundling together (e.g. highway traffic), or more social pat-
terns (e.g. human carried devices). Routing and content distribution algorithms can func-
tion more efficiently, in terms of time-to-deliver and battery consumption, by utilizing the
mobility patterns the nodes follow.
62.2. ROUTING ALGORITHMS
2.2.1. Epidemic Routing. While Epidemic Routing is perhaps the simplest of the
algorithms available, it nonetheless demonstrates both a very high delivery ratio and a low
delay via brute force. Sometimes called Flooding, this algorithm takes advantage of every
encounter, transmitting all messages to all available nodes. Messages are spread through
the network, ‘infecting’ nodes at every opportunity (hence the original title). Provided
messages never expire, they are guaranteed to eventually reach the destination [5].
The procedure begins when both NodeA and NodeB come into contact range. After
establishing a connection, NodeA transmits a list of message identifiers within its buffer to
NodeB. A check is performed in NodeB, creating a list of messages it wants from NodeA.
Afterwards, another check identifies the messages in NodeB’s buffer which are not held by
NodeA. Both lists are transmitted to NodeA, so both nodes are aware of which messages
they need to transmit. After transmitting the messages they transmit acknowledgements
and message hashes to ensure all messages are received successfully.
A variation on Epidemic Routing is adding a hop count attribute to messages. This
attribute indicates the maximum times a particular message will be transmitted, reducing
itself at each stage. A hop count close to the expected distance between the sender and the
receiver nodes can reduce the total energy expended in the network by ensuring messages
are not retransmitted ad infinitum.
Epidemic Routing is generally considered a baseline of comparison for routing algo-
rithms, partly due to ease of implementation and its high delivery ratio. However, imple-
menting this algorithm in a realistic environment has certain difficulties. Sending messages
at every opportunity often results in message collision. When several nodes in the same area
attempt to transmit messages simultaneously the messages are garbled. Both acknowledge-
ment and retransmission fails to resolve this issue. The algorithm also tends to overfill the
message buffer very quickly. This is especially when using low-cost nodes such as those
used by a wireless sensor network. Due to these limitations, the Epidemic algorithm works
7best in low traffic, low connectivity environments with high powered devices, such as smart
phones.
2.2.2. MaxProp. When Epidemic Routing overflows the buffer, it removes mes-
sages in a last-in-first-off manner. This removal is based on the assumption that messages
which have been in the buffer longer have already been delivered and can therefore be re-
moved without consequence. While generally true, this method ignores information about
a node’s access to the destination or if the message has already been delivered. The Max-
Prop algorithm is a variation on Epidemic Routing which prioritizes messages, affecting
both the order of transmission and buffer removal[6].
A message’s priority is based on both a given node’s likelihood to deliver the message
and the likelihood that other nodes will deliver the message. A given node’s probability is
estimated using incremental averaging. Upon contact, a node’s probability to deliver that
destination is increased by 1. All node probabilities are then normalized to sum to 1. This
method allows nodes to track both recent and current contacts very well. Previous contacts,
however, tend to be overridden regardless of how well they performed historically.
When two nodes encounter each other, they first deliver any messages that are in-
tended for the other node. Nodes then exchange probability data, containing the likelihood
of delivering a message to any given node. The next step is to share delivery acknowledge-
ments; this step allows nodes to share information about which messages have already been
received and can therefore be dropped from the buffer. At this stage, both nodes have all of
the data they need for actual message transmission. Priority is given to any messages which
have not traveled beyond a certain distance from the source node; this behavior forces mes-
sages to be flooded to nearby nodes, ensuring all messages are propagated. Finally, each
node transmits all messages in the order of delivery probability.
These additions to the Epidemic Routing algorithm allow MaxProp to transmit mes-
sages while avoiding some of the redundant transmissions. By prioritizing between mes-
sages for transmissions and buffer removals, the algorithm routes more efficiently than base
8Epidemic Routing. Overall, however, it has many of the same advantages and disadvan-
tages as Epidemic Routing: high delivery ratio, low delivery time, very high energy con-
sumption, signal noise, and buffer overflows that cripples the network as traffic increases.
2.2.3. AODV. The routing algorithm Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV)
is based on obtaining the path a message will follow before transmitting the actual message
[7]. To send a message, the node first floods the network with path requests. Each node
appends its identity to the path request before broadcasting it to other nodes within range.
When the destination node receives the path request, it replies along the same route to the
original source. The source can then use the path to transmit the message. As a result, the
path requests flood the network while the message itself follows the shortest path to the
destination, provided one exists.
This algorithm is primarily used in relatively static, highly connected networks. It
does not need to store messages in a large buffer, allowing it to function using low-powered
devices. Additionally, because the nodes only broadcast when a message is sent, there is no
overhead and little energy is used use unless a message is actively being transmitted. The
algorithm fails to function in an intermittently connected network; if nodes cannot deliver
the message directly to the destination they will not forward the message to a node more
capable of delivery. This is a useful, efficient algorithm, but one with severe limitations.
2.2.4. Probabilistic. As an alternative to sending either messages or path requests
epidemically, the Probabilistic Routing algorithm was designed to forward messages only
to nodes more capable of delivering them to a destination [8]. This algorithm was designed
primarily for highly disruptive networks which cannot afford high message traffic, such
as wireless sensor networks. When a node is carrying a message, its own probability of
delivery slowly decreases. When the node encounters another with a higher probability the
message is transferred, and the sending node increases its probability estimate. For exam-
ple, when NodeA and NodeB encounter each other, both nodes compare their probability of
delivery, σA and σB. If σB is greater, then NodeA will transfer the message and increase σA.
9The control variable α, between 0 and 1, determines how rapidly the probability estimates
change based on new data. A high α is suitable for more static environments; a lower α
reflects patterns shifting periodically, disregarding previous probability estimates. This is
illustrated in Figure 2.1.












Figure 2.1. Successful Message Delivery
In addition, to reflect a node’s inability to deliver messages the probability decays
occasionally as a message times out, as shown in Figure 2.2. If a message is contained in a
buffer over a certain period without being forwarded, the node is considered to be unable to
deliver the message, and the probability estimates are reduced to reflect this inability. Note
that a timeout (depending upon implementation) will not actually remove a message from
the buffer, but it will lower the probability of the containing node.













Figure 2.2. Message Timeout
Because the destination node has a probability of 100%, the node probability prop-
agates throughout the network. The nodes within 1 hop of the destination will increase
their probability as they deliver messages. Then the nodes 2 hops away will increase their
probability when they transfer to the 1 hop neighbors, ad infinitum. This process continues
until all nodes have an accurate measurement of their probability to deliver a message.
Although not designed specifically for mobile networks, the Probabilistic algorithm
can function within them if the nodes follow repeated patterns. Because only a single
copy of any given message exists, any node not actively involved in routing a message can
remain idle which lowers energy costs. Because the algorithm has no load distribution the
optimal nodes quickly lose battery life by routing other node’s messages, shortening the
network lifespan. A more significant disadvantage, however, is that the probability only
changes when messages are sent. In a low traffic environment, the probability estimate (σ)
will be wildly inaccurate. Efforts to improve this inaccuracy by sending a series of junk
messages increases network costs considerably.
2.2.5. PRoPHET. A more proactive solution to the routing problem is the Prob-
abilistic Routing Protocol using History of Encounters and Transitivity (PRoPHET)[9].
PRoPHET is similar to Probabilistic Routing in that nodes estimate their probability of de-
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livering a message and then route messages based on these estimates, but the probability
is based on contact frequency rather than upon previous message performance. Variable
σA,B indicates the probability that NodeA can successfully deliver a message to NodeB.
PRoPHET is based on three methods of adjusting the probability estimates: direct contact,
indirect contact, and decay. Direct contact occurs whenever two nodes come to point to
point contact. The control variable Pinit determines how much the delivery probability σA,B
changes on each contact.
σA,B = σA,B +(1−σA,B)∗Pinit (3)
This method allows nodes to keep track of direct contacts. In addition, PRoPHET
allows nodes to adjust their probability estimates based upon indirect contacts, indicating
that NodeA can successfully deliver a message to NodeB by routing through another node.
This increase, known as either transitive or indirect contact, occurs when NodeA encounters
NodeB. Both nodes increase the chance of delivery for all nodes the other has encountered.
Similar to Pinit , the control variable β determines the rate of increase.
σA,C = σA,C +(1−σA,C)∗σA,B ∗σB,C ∗β (4)
Both direct and indirect contact can raise the probability of delivery. An accurate es-
timate of the delivery chance, however, must reduce itself whenever nodes do not encounter
for long periods. For this reason, a probability decay function performs periodically. The
rate of decay is based on the control variable γ, occuring periodically in every node.
σA,B = σA,B ∗ γtime (5)
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These three events occur continuously throughout the network lifetime, working to
make the estimate σA,B an accurate representation of the probability of delivery. When a
node with a message encounters another node, it compares σ. If the encountered node has
a higher chance of delivery, it forwards the message. The PRoPHET routing algorithm
is ideal for disconnected networks following some patterns of contact and adapts well to
changing layouts. PRoPHET has a notable weakness in that it maintains the probabilities
whether there is any traffic or not. While this is a significant energy drain, it also allows
messages to be consistently sent to new nodes.
2.2.6. SimBet. The SimBet routing algorithm [10] is a node-to-node routing algo-
rithm that takes advantage of the social structure of the network. Nodes engage in ‘con-
versations’ when they meet, exchanging information about both data messages and current
neighboring nodes. This information is used to determine ‘betweenness’ and ‘similarity’.
Betweenness is a measure of how often a node lies on a path between otherwise
unconnected nodes. Equation 6 shows the method for calculating the betweenness of nodei,
where g jk(this) is the number of paths from node j to nodek that include nodethis, and g jk

















Similarity is simply the ratio of common neighbors between two nodes. To calculate
similarity between nodex and nodey, identify all nodes which are neighbors to either, as









Once both metrics are calculated, the system can route through nodes with higher val-
ues. Both metrics are locally determined; global knowledge of the network is not needed.
The ratio of priority given to either metric is the control variable α and can affect the sys-
tems performance. When two nodes encounter, they determine their relative SimBetUtil
(see eqn. 10), and all messages are forwarded to the node with the higher value.
SimBetUtili = αSimUtili +(1−α)BetUtili,∀i ∈ DT N (10)
A notable disadvantage of SimBet is the quantity of messages the aforementioned
conversations send across the network. The amount of data which must be exchanged is a
significant strain on the node’s limited power supply. Additionally, relationships between
nodes in SimBet are represented as either in-contact or not-in-contact. More specific in-
formation, such as percent of time in contact, would result in a better measure of a node’s
likelihood to forward a message to the destination.
2.3. SECURITY IN DTN
2.3.1. Public Key Encryption. Originally, encryption was performed using a
shared secret (e.q., passwords, large numbers, or book titles) communicated by secure
channels [11]. In order for Alice to communicate securely with Bob, they had to pri-
vately exchange a key. That key was the basis for encryption or decryption of all secure
message traffic. When performing large scale communications, the distribution of these
keys was always a security risk - difficult and dangerous. As mathematics progressed, the
theory of asymmetric encryption was developed. These encryption techniques would allow
a user with a publicly available key to encrypt messages for a destination, but access to that
key could not decrypt the message. Such encryption schemes enabled large scale secure
communications, as any user could securely send a message provided he had access to the
public key.
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The first public-key encryption algorithm was developed by James Ellis, Clifford
Cocks, and Malcolm Williamson[11]. These cryptographers worked for the Government
Communications Headquarters, a British intelligence agency dedicated to signal intelli-
gence. Due to the secret nature of the organization, they did not disclose their discovery.
This secrecy resulted in Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman independently researching
and publishing the ‘first’ public key exchange algorithm: the Diffie-Hellman Key Ex-
change. Later, a series of MIT mathematicians, Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard
Adleman, independently developed a version of Ellis’ work that enabled public keys to be
distributed openly for secure communication[11] [12]. Currently, several public key al-
gorithms are available; the most commonly used are RSA, ElGamal, and Elliptical Curve
Cryptography.
Public key infrastructures are considered secure in wired networks when nodes set-
ting up to communicate securely can exchange keys. A series of trusted servers containing
public keys are available. These servers are used if the destination computer or user is not
immediately available. However, this infrastructure is difficult to implement in DTNs since
messages take longer to deliver. Further, a public key exchange is vulnerable to Main in
the Middle (MitM) attacks. When NodeA sends its public key to NodeB, nothing exists to
stop a malicious node along the way from replacing the key with their own. By controlling
the key nodes use to communicate, the node can access any secure traffic. Techniques to
prevent this are difficult to implement in a DTNs, requiring either precise timing or verifi-
cation by several other nodes. While the public key infrastructure is a powerful tool, there
are difficulties applying it to DTNs.
2.3.2. Threshold Encryption. Generally, encryption algorithms use a single key to
encrypt a message, and a single key to decrypt a message. A class of encryption algorithms,
known as Threshold Encryption, encrypts a message and then generates several decryption
keys [13]. A subset of those keys must be used to decrypt the message.
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Shamir’s Secret Sharing key is a sample threshold encryption algorithm[14]. To en-
crypt a number m, a k-degree polynomial equation is plotted, where k + 1 is the number
of keys needed to decrypt the algorithm. For example, when the user wants for 4 keys to
decrypt the message, the algorithm will generate f (x) = a∗ x3 +b∗ x2 + c∗ x+d. Coeffi-
cients a, b, and c, are randomly generated, but d is selected such that f (1) = m. Because the
k-degree curve can be plotted correctly once k + 1 points are known, points on the curve
(y, f (y)) are treated as the threshold keys. Once an intended recipient has obtained any
k+1 keys he can solve for a, b, c, and d, finally generating f (1), the original message.
This encryption algorithm is very useful in unreliable networks, where keys can be
lost due to either failed routing or message disruption. Because as many keys as desired
can be generated, the algorithm can be scaled to match the reliability of the network. This
feature makes reliable security possible in a DTN, as demonstrated in Section IV.
2.3.3. Onion Routing. A security system currently used in wired networks is
the Onion Router, also known as Tor [15]. The purpose of this system is to privately and
anonymously transmit messages to a destination. Neither the destination nor any moni-
toring nodes are allowed to know both the source and destination of the messages. The
technique uses a series of proxies, public key and symmetric key encryption, and a series
of publicly available servers.
When Alice wants to establish an anonymous connection using a Tor network, she
first reviews the servers that contain a list of computers volunteering to act as proxies.
The servers contains the IP addresses and public keys of the computers. Alice randomly
selects 3 nodes, acquiring both their IPA and their KeyA. The final node, ProxyC, is the exit
relay, which will have unmonitored traffic. Alice then generates a series of symmetric keys
using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). AES is a powerful symmetric encryption
algorithm, which the proxies will use to communicate between themselves. Alice then
generates AESA,B, the symmetric key which ProxyA and ProxyB will use to communicate,
for all proxy pairs. With this data, Alice prepares the message to be sent through the
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network. The message is composed of a series of contact information layers, each of which
contains the address and encryption data of both the previous and the next step in the proxy
chain. Each node, upon receiving the message, will remove its layer of encryption, establish
a secure channel to the previous proxy, and send the remainder of the message to the next
node.
When ProxyA receives the message, it has no difficulty removing the first layer of
encryption. This action reveals the source of the message IPAlice, the next step in the chain
IPB, and the secure keys to be used to send future messages up and down the chain. The
remainder is still encrypted with KeyB and, thus, is sent on. (An important note: ProxyA
cannot access any information about the chain beyond the two nodes it is between - it is all
encrypted.) Later nodes will not have access to the source of the stream; without IPAlice,
they can only guess the source of the connection.
After each proxy has received the AES of the previous and the next proxy,
ProxyC sends an encrypted acknowledgement message back up the chain of proxies -
AESBtoC(ack). At each proxy, the AES encryption layer is removed and replaced with
the next stages. The result is that messages can be sent securely, without any proxy know-
ing both the source and the destination of the chain. The final node, ProxyC, is the link
to the outside world, in the sense that it will make requests on Alice’s behalf to insecure
servers along open channels. Anyone monitoring ProxyC can identify its traffic but cannot
link it to Alice.
Tor networks are secure in the sense that they preserve both the privacy of the source
and the destination nodes. Already implemented in large scale, they are useful in monitored
environments. There is ongoing research into timing attacks on the Tor network, which
work by deliberately delaying Alice’s traffic. If the delays are noticed on the exit node, a
monitor can link the source and destination of traffic. These attacks, however, are difficult
to implement [16].
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While invaluable for wired communications, an Onion Router network is difficult to
implement in a DTN. Without consistent access to the central server, a node has to generate
its own list of device addresses and public key information, and an adversary can inject false
data into these lists. To address these issues is the purpose of 3PE, detailed in Section IV.
2.3.4. EnPassant. Researchers Vakde et. al. [17] have detailed one solution to
the Tor weaknesses as they apply to the DTNs. The purpose of the EnPassant algorithm
is to disguise the source of a message by both encrypting it and forwarding it through the
network. Each node is arbitrarily assigned to a pawn group, a set of nodes with a shared
public-private key pair. Messages are encrypted with the public keys of these groups, then
forwarded through any member of the selected groups. Unlike Tor, there is no access to
a central server containing information on each device. However, nodes can reasonably
contain a key for each group.
The process begins when the sending node selects which groups to use as prox-
ies. The message is first encrypted and then sent on to a member of the first group -
KeyGroup1(KeyGroup2(KeyGroup3(dest,msg))). The method of selecting a member of the
pawn groups to send the message to was studied. The nodes can select either randomly
for improved security, the nearest member for greater speed, or, if the nodes have enough
information, the member closest to the original path from the source to the destination.
Regardless of how the next member is chosen, a member of Group1 should acquire the
message. This member removes the Group1 layer of encryption and forwards it to the next
group. At the final stage, a member of Group3 will acquire the message, and so has no
information on the original sender. This node removes the final encryption layer, revealing
both the actual message and the destination. It can now forward the message to the actual
message destination.
While this technique has little impact on either the delivery ratio or the speed of mes-
sages, the question remains about how well it addresses Byzantine attacks. These attacks
assume the adversary is capable of controlling a portion of the network, either by taking
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over machines already in the network or by inserting devices controlled by the adversary.
Because each member of a pawn group acquires access to the private key information of
that group, if the message reaches a compromised node first the adversary can remove that
group’s layer of encryption, and forward it to another compromised member of another
group. Because the first to receive the message has knowledge of the source of the mes-
sage, and the final member is compromised, the adversary has access to both the source
and the destination, violating anonymity. This ignores the possibility that the adversary
will simply share compromised keys, allowing the first node to read the message without
needing to forward anything. Although the algorithm can disguise the path from monitors,
it does little to protect messages from partially compromised networks.
2.4. CONTENT DISTRIBUTION
2.4.1. R-P2P. The R-P2P system is designed to allow mobile repositories to request
data items from other repositories. By maintaining a Distributed Hash Table (DHT), a
repository can identify the location of a particular data item quickly and efficiently. This
allows a node to find the location of a data item by referring to the nearest repository,
improving the time to delivery. One contribution of this article was the introduction of the
throwbox concept, in which a server designates other nodes in the network to store and
distribute data. Distributing content in this manner improves delivery time, and efficient
identification of the nodes to act as throwboxes improves it further.
2.4.2. OnMove. An earlier attempt to improve throwbox selection by using social
context was the OnMove protocol. The system is designed to determine optimal place-
ment with a series of metrics, including social similarity, meet frequency, and betweenness
(among others). By assigning different weights to each metric the protocol can optimize
itself for any environment. While the overview is promising, the complete protocol was
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The patterns of movement used by Mobile Ad-Hoc networks are application specific,
in the sense that networks use nodes which travel in different paths. When these nodes
are used in experiments involving social patterns, such as wildlife tracking, algorithms
which detect and use these patterns can be used to improve routing efficiency. The intent of
this paper is to introduce a routing algorithm which forms a series of social groups which
accurately indicate a node’s regular contact patterns while dynamically shifting to represent
changes to the social environment. With the social groups formed, a probabilistic routing
schema is used to effectively identify which social groups have consistent contact with the
base station, and route accordingly. The algorithm can be implemented dynamically, in the
sense that the nodes initially have no awareness of their environment, and works to reduce
overhead and message traffic while maintaining high delivery ratio.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile Ad-hoc networks are a collection of computing devices connected through
wireless communications, such as Bluetooth or wireless LAN. They are characterized by
the mobility and dynamic nature of the devices, referred to as nodes. This mobility makes
conventional routing algorithms ineffective or inapplicable, and to accommodate these en-
vironments new routing methods have been developed. These routing methods are gen-
erally examples of Delay Tolerant Routing, which holds copies of transmitted messages
to transmit them to appropriate nodes, as opposed to traditional routing which broadcasts
them immediately.
As a general rule, routing algorithms are more effective when they can rely on more
information regarding the mobility patterns of nodes. Conventional probabilistic routing
schema assumes consistent avenues of communication - nodes which interact with a set
group of nodes in the past will do so again in the future [1]. Similarly, social routing
assumes that nodes that are assigned to the same social network (classroom, project team)
will regularly interact with members of that social group. To take advantage of the partial
applicability of both social and probabilistic routing, a grouping method is studied which
will form social groups based on contact patterns. With these groups identified, consistent
routes to basestations are identified based on the delivery history of a group or node. We
compare this algorithm, called Dynamic Social Grouping (DSG), with two well known
algorithms referred as Epidemic routing [2] and Probabilistic routing [1], and results show
that DSG performs better than both routing algorithms in terms of message delivery ratio
and the time to deliver a message.
The objective of this algorithm is to reliably deliver messages from a group of sen-
sor nodes to basestation nodes, as presented in Probabilistic Routing, using as few com-
munications as possible. The basestations are immobile, and thus can use more reliable
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communications to transmit the data to the end user, but the sensor nodes are attached to
mobile social entities. This algorithm is designed to identify social groups without rely-
ing on outside information, based only on its contact patterns with other nodes. A given
node may belong to several social groups and will attempt to merge together groups who
share common members. Once the social groups are identified, routing occurs through
these groups based on which group has more reliable access to the basestations, as de-
termined by the reliability of previously delivered messages. Simulations with real-world
data comparing DSG to Probabilistic and Epidemic routing algorithms show that the Dy-
namic Social Grouping algorithm is superior in terms of delivery ratio and message costs to
the Probabilistic scheme in a social environment, and much less expensive than Epidemic
routing while maintaining high delivery ratio and low transit time (refer to Section 4 for
details). Applications of this technique include wildlife tracking or tracking human social




Research in the area of Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN) has been receiving consid-
erable attention in the last few years owing to their widespread occurrence in a variety
of applications. Routing and data aggregation are of particular interest as they affect the
performance of the network as a whole and also affect longevity of the sensor nodes con-
siderably. A survey of routing techniques for DTNs is presented in [3].
2.1. EPIDEMIC ROUTING
Epidemic routing [2] was designed for partially connected networks, and its goal is
to maximize the message delivery ratio while minimizing the time necessary to deliver
a message. The main strategy is to pass messages along to each node encountered, in
hopes of making a connection with parts of the network with low connectivity. In wireless
sensor networks, this often results in excessive network traffic which reduces the life of the
network. Also, minimizing time to message delivery is not as important in delay tolerant
networks. That said that the delivery ratio of epidemic routing is considered the ideal
delivery ratio possible when ignoring network life or node overflow.
2.2. PROBABILISTIC ROUTING
Introduced by Yu Wang, the Probabilistic Routing Schema [1] is based on individual
nodes having a set probability of successfully delivering a message to a base station. This
probability is based on the set of neighbors which the node regularly interacts with, and as
such it is based on regular, if not social, patterns of movement. Nodes individually begin
with a set delivery probability and transfer the messages they are carrying to neighbors with
higher delivery probability, adjusting their own probability upward as they do so. If they
are carrying a message when it times out their probability is reduced to reflect the node’s
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inability to transfer. This algorithm shows a marked improvement in terms of message
transmission rate while maintaining a high delivery probability, but does not take advantage
of any knowledge other than past contacts.
2.3. BUBBLE RAP
The Bubble-Rap grouping method [4] allocates nodes into social groups based on
direct and indirect contacts. They distribute using a method called k−cliques, in which all
fully connected groups of k members are considered a distinct social group and are then
merged with all other k−cliques which can be reached through k−1 nodes. This provides
a very accurate representation of the social groups formed by a set of nodes. However,
it relies on global knowledge of the nodes’ contacts, and it must have them before the
algorithm can group them. In this sense, k-grouping is neither dynamic nor distributed,
which limits it’s applicability to a MANET.
2.4. SOCIALCAST
Costa et al. described an application using social dynamics for a publish/subscribe
schemata across a wireless sensor network. They detail a SocialCast model [5], in which
nodes are assigned a Utility Value for each interest in which they participate which indicates
their routing utility for that group. By separating the routing utility from group participa-
tion, the authors improve the lifespan and routing efficiency of the wireless nodes. The
given algorithm is designed for use across a publish/subscribe model, as well as a wireless
network (as opposed to a sensor network), but can still serve as a basis for further research,
especially regarding the social dynamics described, such as the Caveman Model.
2.5. SIMBET
The SimBet routing algorithm [6] has a similar routing structure to DSG in that it
takes advantage of Social Grouping and contact patterns to predict paths to node destina-
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tions, improving delivery ratio and time. The algorithm calculates the Betweenness rating
of a node, which is a measurement of the number of message routes which contain the
node. By using this, as well as the Centrality of the node, the algorithm can route mes-
sages through to destination nodes with remarkable efficiency. A notable deficiency of this
algorithm is it’s reliance on near-complete knowledge of neighboring nodes, increasing
traffic and memory use. It can, however, deliver messages from node to node, whereas the
Dynamic Social Grouping algorithm is strictly node to base station.
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3. PROPOSED ALGORITHM
The algorithm addresses two distinct subproblems. First, given an arbitrary collection
of nodes, the network must identify cohesive social patterns, and identify them as groups,
at the same time distributing this information throughout the network. This network orga-
nization can change to reflect changes to the network or to the social patterns of the nodes.
Second, once the networks have been identified, a route must be identified to deliver mes-
sages to a base station. Delivery must minimize the number of message repetitions while
ensuring a high percentage of messages delivered to the destination.
3.1. GROUPING
A major advantage this algorithm has over conventional mobile ad-hoc routing meth-
ods is the use of social groups to improve communication throughput. The task of identify-
ing such groups, however, requires knowledge of the nodes which is not present at startup.
3.1.1. Contact Strength. The first task in identifying a social group is to calculate
a metric for the contact frequency two nodes have with one another. The symbol λi, j is
used to represent the contact strength between two nodes. This is measured as a function
of the time from the previous contact, where the symbol φ is used to determine how much
the λ changes based on new data. Initially, λi, j will be 0 between all nodes, but when nodes
contact one another, it is recalculated as shown in Eqn 11.
λA,B = (1−φ)λA,B + φtimecurrent− timeprev (11)
3.1.2. Forming New Groups. When the λi, j exceeds a certain threshold ψ, the
nodes can identify as being members of the same group. Initially, all groups will have
two members. The node with the higher delivery probability (as defined in section 3.2.1)
be designated the group clusterhead - this node has the responsibility of maintaining the
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group membership list and approving any changes to the group. The group will also have
its probability set to the average of the two founding members (this will be expanded upon
in section 3.2).
(a) Joint members of the Dot
Group and Stripe Group send a
Suggestion to the Stripe Cluster-
head
(b) Stripe Clusterhead confirms
the Group Merge and sends an
Invitation to the Dot Cluster-
head
(c) The Dot Clusterhead con-
firms again and adds all Stripe
Members to the Dot Group
Figure 3.1. Three Stages of Merging Groups
3.1.3. Merging. Having formed two-node groups, the next step is to determine
which of these groups can be merged with each other to form larger, more applicable social
groups. Groups are merged when the similarity between the groups exceeds a threshold
value τ. Similarity is defined as the number of common members divided by the total num-
ber of members in both groups. Each node checks through its list of groups periodically to
see if the groups should be merged. If it finds two groups that qualify for a merger, it sends a
suggestion message to the clusterhead of the smaller group, as shown in Figure 3.1(a). This
message is distributed epidemically through that group until it arrives at the clusterhead,
which contains the up-to-date member list of the group. Once the clusterhead receives the
suggestion it compares it’s member list with the member list for the larger group (contained
within the suggestion message), confirms that the groups should be merged, and sends an
invitation message to the clusterhead of the larger group (Figure 3.1(b)). The larger group’s
clusterhead repeats the confirmation. Once confirmed, the clusterhead updates the member
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list to include the new members from the smaller group (Figure 3.1(c)). A Kill message is
then sent to remove the smaller group. This process is detailed in Algorithm 1.
3.1.4. Dynamic Grouping. Due to changing social patterns, group membership
needs to allow nodes to remove themselves from a group’s membership, as shown in Al-
gorithm 2. To reduce communication overhead and group fragmentation, however, the
clusterhead has to know about the resignation immediately. When a node contacts the clus-
terhead it will calculate it’s GroupλA,Y , which is the average λA,B between the node and
all members of the group, to determine whether it should resign from the group. If this
average λ is below the threshold ψ, it sends a resignation to the clusterhead and removes
the group data. This method has the advantage of low overhead and communication, but
nodes cannot leave the group until they contact the clusterhead, which can result in nodes
maintaining group data for groups they don’t participate in. Experiments which allowed
nodes to periodically review their groups and resign through a message sent to any group
member resulted in badly fragmented group data.
3.1.5. Group Versions. A constant issue when creating dynamic groups is reflect-
ing changes to the group data to all members of that group. Data fragmentation occurs
whenever two nodes, members of the same Social Group, have different data regarding
that group’s membership. To prevent this issue, all changes are controlled by the group’s
Clusterhead. This node, arbitrarily chosen, holds the group’s master member list.
As movement patterns change or are revealed, there will be changes to a group’s member-
ship. The Clusterhead will increment the version value of the group as changes are made,
including merges and nodes resigning from the group. Whenever two members of the same
group meet, they compare the version number of their local copy of the group. The higher
version number is the one whose information regarding the group came from the cluster-
head more recently. This information is copied over to the less recent node, along with the
version number. This process is detailed in Algorithm 3.
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Algorithm 1 Merging Groups
Notation
GroupY , GroupZ - Any social groups in MANET
NodeA - Member of both GroupY and GroupZ
NodeB - Clusterhead of GroupY , ClusterheadY
NodeC - Clusterhead of GroupZ , ClusterheadZ
τ - Threshold for Merging a Group
Trigger - Periodically in NodeA




|GroupY ⋃GroupZ | > τ then
if |GroupY |> |GroupZ| then
Send SUGGEST Message to all members of GroupZ
else
Send SUGGEST Message to all members of GroupY
end ifcannot determine size of graphic no boundingbox
end if
end for
Trigger - NodeA contacts NodeB
In NodeA...
for all GroupY which contain both NodeA and NodeB do
if NodeA has Control Messages for GroupY then
NodeA sends Control Messages to NodeB
end if
end for
Nodes pass Control Messages epidemically to all Group Members
Trigger - NodeB receives SUGGEST message




|GroupY ⋃GroupZ | > τ then
Send INVITE Message to all members of GroupZ
end if
end if
The Clusterhead confirms the suggestion, and sends an Invite to the other group
Trigger - NodeC receives INVITE message









Send KILL message to GroupY
end if
end if
If both Group Clusterheads approve, the smaller group is added to the larger, and then
removed.
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Algorithm 2 Dynamic Groups
Notation
NodeA - Member of GroupY
NodeB - Clusterhead of GroupY , ClusterheadY
NodeListY - All nodes in GroupY
GroupλA,Y - Contact Strength between NodeA and NodeListY
ψ - Threshold for Forming a Group
Trigger - NodeA contacts NodeB
In NodeA
if NodeB is ClusterheadY then
GroupλY = Average(λA,Y )
if GroupλY < ψ then
Send RESIGN to NodeB
Remove GroupY from NodeB
end if
end if
Trigger - NodeB receives RESIGN from NodeA
NodeListY = NodeListY −NodeA
Algorithm 3 Group Updates
Notation
VersionA,Y - Version Number of GroupY kept by NodeA
Trigger - NodeA contacts NodeB
In NodeA
for all GroupY which contains both NodeA and NodeB do
Send VersionA,Y to NodeB
Receive VersionB,Y from NodeB
if VersionA,Y >VersionB,Y then
Send GroupY to NodeB
else if VersionA,Y >VersionB,Y then






Having organized the nodes into social groups, the algorithm can now use this infor-
mation to route data to the base station. The Probabilistic method assigns a metric to each
node to depict the node’s chance of successfully delivering the message, and continually
routes messages to higher performing nodes until the message reaches a destination. To
improve on this the DSG identifies a similar metric to measure a group’s ability to deliver
a message to the base station. Both methods are described below.
3.2.1. Individual Probability. Nodes are initially assigned a default probability
σ, while base stations are assigned a probability of 100%. When nodes encounter one
another, they compare probabilities to determine routing (more on this in section 3.2.3).
The member with the lower probability will forward all its messages to the other, and then
it will update its σ to reflect the ability of the node to deliver either directly or indirectly
to a base station. The result is that nodes with immediate access to a base station achieve
a higher probability, and the probability cascades outwards through node contacts. The
cascade rate is determined by a control variable α, which is similar to φ in that is controls
how quickly the probability changes based on new data. For details, review Algorithm 4.
In addition to message transmission, the Individual Probability σ can also update to
reflect inability to deliver a message. Messages log the time they were originally sent, and
can use this to determine if they have been in the system too long. When these messages
expire, all nodes which contain the message have their individual probability reduced to
reflect their inability to reach a sink.
3.2.2. Group Probability. Each node calculates group probability, depicted as β,
independently, based on the contact patterns of that specific node. This means that each
node will have different values for the probability of the same group, but these values are
based on the subset of the group which each node contacts. Nodes which exist in a common
group and are not encountered are estimated using the current group probability. The exact
method, described also in Algorithm 5, begins when NodeA contacts NodeB and both are
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Algorithm 4 Calculating Individual Probability
Notation
NodeA, NodeB - Nodes in MANET
σA - Individual Probability for NodeA
σB - Individual Probability for NodeB
messagei - Message in MANET
timeSenti - Time messagei was sent
timeOut - Parameter determining max duration of messages
α - Control Parameter determining Probability decay ratio
Trigger - NodeA transmits messagei to NodeB
σA = (1−α)σA +ασB
Trigger - Periodical maintenance in NodeA
for all messagei in NodeA do





in GroupY . Since the σ for all other nodes in GroupY are unknown, they are assumed to
be the current βY . It then calculates the average probability of all members of the group,
based on previous βY , σA, and σB, as detailed in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 Calculating Group Probability
Definition
βY - Group Probability for GroupY
Trigger - NodeA contacts NodeB
NodeA sends σA to NodeB
NodeA receives σB from NodeB
for all GroupY which contain NodeB and NodeA do
βY = σA+σB+βY×(|GroupY |−2)|GroupY |
end for
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3.2.3. Using Probabilities to Route. When two nodes contact each other, they
independently determine their γ value. This is the maximum probability of all the groups
they participate with and their individual probability. The node with the higher value is
assumed to either have more consistent contact with the base station or to be a member of a
group which has consistent contact. In either event, the node with the lower value transfers
all messages to the node with the higher probability, then updates its individual probability
based on successful delivery of a message. This algorithm is detailed in Algorithm 6.
Previously, the individual probability was adjusted by the individual probability, but
as the system gains more information it can update based on the groups it contacts, rather
than the individual nodes. For this reason, the individual probability (Algorithm 4) is ad-
justed to use the γB of the destination node, rather than the individual probability σB.
Algorithm 6 Routing Algorithm
Notation
βA - List of all Group Probabilities in NodeA
γA - Max Group / Individual Probability of NodeA
Trigger - NodeA contacts NodeB
In NodeA
γA = max(βA,σA)
Transmit γ to NodeB
Receive γB from NodeB
if γB > γA then
Transmit messages to NodeB
σA = (1−α)σa +αγB
else




4.1. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND EVALUATION
To evaluate this algorithm and the impact of control variables a simulation was de-
signed and implemented using MATLAB. Once the routing efficiency was determined, a
power consumption comparison was performed in NesC, using a TOSSIM simulator mod-
ified with PowerTossim Z. For comparison, both simulations also ran Epidemic Routing
and base Probabilistic Routing schema. Epidemic Routing is considered to be the ideal
in terms of message time and delivery ratio, and is therefore used for comparison, while
Probabilistic Routing is an improvement over Epidemic in terms of resources used. Other
comparable algorithms were reviewed, but either use previous knowledge of the environ-
ment (such as Bubble Rap) or are targeted to solve different communication issues (Simbet
performing node-to-node communication, while SocialCast performing publish/subscribe
broadcasts). For these reasons, the Probabilistic and Epidemic schemas were considered
as comparable algorithms. The control variables tested, along with ideal values identified,
can be found in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1. Variable Reference Chart
Control Variables Range Tested Ideal Value
α Probability Decay Rate 0.05 - 0.5 0.075
ψ Group Formation Threshold 0.0001 - 0.005 0.004
τ Group Merge Threshold 0.1 - 0.33 0.3
φ Contact Decay Ratio 0.1 - 0.5 0.3
Ideal values tested by experimentation
Variables
λ Contact Strength between nodes
σ Node’s Probability of Delivery
β Group’s Probability of Delivery
γ Maximum probability of Delivery
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4.2. SIMULATION DATA SOURCE
To accurately implement this algorithm, the node contacts must follow social pat-
terns. Potential sources for this are either real-life tracking data or the results from a social
prediction algorithm, such as the Caveman Model. For this reason the simulation used
data obtained from an experiment conducted by the University of Cambridge at the 2005
Grand Hyatt Miami IEEE Infocom conference. Participants were asked to carry iMotes
with them during the conference for 3 to 4 days to capture data on social interactions [7].
Although the experiment did not include base stations capable of collecting information,
they did include static immobile nodes. For simulation purposes, these units were treated
as data sinks.
4.3. IMPACT OF α AND ψ
Based on the dataset used, the α setting is directly influenced by the dynamic nature
of the contact patterns. In either long range simulations or simulations in which nodes
consistently follow similar contact patterns, a lower value for α can result in more effective
simulations. In contrast, a higher α results in the algorithm placing more weight in recent
data. If the probability is more dynamic, it can more rapidly respond to changes in the
layout.
The ψ setting influences the ease with which the nodes form social groups. In an
environment in which nodes only encounter other nodes they are in a social group of, a
lower value can result in the network being rapidly organized, whereas a higher ψ results
in groups forming slowly, and only with regular contacts.
The results (as shown in Figure 4.1) indicate a peak Message Delivery Ratio as α de-
creases and ψ increases. The lower α seems to be due to the large amount of ‘garbage’ data
- a node which successfully delivers to the basestation is quite likely just passing through,
and will not likely be a good long-range contact. A lower α allows the algorithm to ignore
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these incidental contacts and concentrate on nodes which regularly successfully deliver.
Similarly, the ψ peak value is based on ignoring the large number of casual contacts. Be-
cause this dataset occurs at a conference, there are several regular contacts between nodes

























































































(c) Admin Message Traffic
Figure 4.1. Impact of α and ψ
4.4. IMPACT OF τ AND φ
The control variable τ represents the level of similarity necessary for groups to be
merged. A higher value for τ results in fewer groups being merged and keeps the group
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size small. This does not influence the number of groups being created; a higher value of
τ will result in several smaller groups. Due to the ratio needed to ensure any group merges
occur, the maximum value for τ is 13 . If it is higher, the initial 2-member groups cannot
have enough common members to merge.
The contact deterioration φ determines how quickly the contact strength changes over
time. A higher value for φ results in the contact strength changing more rapidly. Higher
values would be used in more dynamic environment, so the nodes’ contact strength are
more influenced by recent events than historical data. This value is closely linked to the ψ
value given earlier; more rapidly changing contact strength would result in needing a lower
value of ψ to successfully form groups.
The results, shown in Figure 4.2, indicate that the algorithm functions best when
the τ value is nearly, but not quite, at the maximum value. A τ of 0.3 allows groups to
merge regularly, reflecting larger groups while still ignoring the casual group affiliations.
Similarly, the φ results show peak functionality at the value 0.3, although this may be due
to the ψ value already inserted. These metrics show the largest increase of delivery ratio,
but also increase the average message delivery time (Figure 4.2(b)). That is due to this time
only reflecting delivered messages – by increasing delivered messages, the system includes
several messages which were ignored.
4.5. COMPARISON OF ROUTING ALGORITHMS
A review of the results (Figure 4.3) shows that the DSG Routing Scheme performs
better than the Probabilistic Scheme in all metrics, and is comparable to the Epidemic in
terms of both the delivery ratio and delivery time while having considerably less message
traffic. Some of this is due to the applicability of the dataset – the social environment pro-
vided at the conference provided an area ideal for forming short-term dynamic groups. In
contrast, the Probabilistic Schema had difficulty adjusting to the social groups that formed,


















































































(c) Admin Message Traffic
Figure 4.2. Impact of τ and φ
The results indicate that DSG is comparable to the ideal routing, with considerably less
cost.
A cost comparison of the algorithms was performed in the TOSSIM simulation, us-
ing the PowerTOSSIMZ [8] model, as shown in Figure 4.4. The baseline shown in the
graph shows the simulation’s power comsumption when no routing occurs, to be used as a
comparison point. We use this to find that the Dynamic Social Grouping’s cost is 16%
of Epidemic’s cost, and 18% of the base Probabilistic algorithm’s cost. This includes
the overhead from group management such as group merge invitations, suggestions, and
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Comparison of Total Message Traffic
(c) Total Message Traffic
Figure 4.3. Comparison of DSG Routing, Probabilistic Routing, and Epidemic Routing
Figure 4.4. Comparison of DSG, Probabilistic, and Epidemic Power Consumption
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When considering a routing algorithm for large-scale deployment, there is always
concern by how well the algorithm scales to a higher number of nodes. For this reason,
scalability experiments were performed to find the performance of the DSG algorithm with
differing number of nodes. Because the experiment was performed using a real-world
dataset, it is impossible to add additional nodes to the experiment, but relatively simple
to randomly remove nodes from consideration. The results show that the ratios from the
three algorithms tend to increase as the number of nodes increases, improving connectivity,
but the DSG algorithm doesn’t show a marked improvement until the full 40 nodes are in
use (Figure 4.5(a)). This is due the same control variables being used through the entire
experiment set, from 5 to 40 nodes. As indicated earlier, the algorithm is sensitive to the
control variables used during execution (detailed in Table 4.1) - by using these variables
despite the different environments, performance fluctuates wildly. Nonetheless, the costs
of the system remains consistently lower than the alternatives (Figure 4.5(b)). This is due
to the nature of the administration traffic. As the number of nodes decreases, reducing
node connectivity, the administration overhead is reduced. Fewer groups are being formed,
merged, or updated. As the connectivity increases, it improves routing performance by
enough to offset the overhead.
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(a) Comparison of Delivery Probability versus
Node Count
(b) Comparison of Total Message Traffic versus
Node Count
Figure 4.5. Scalability Experiments
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5. CONCLUSIONS
The Dynamic Social Grouping (DSG) algorithm has been shown to provide a signif-
icant increase in efficiency over probabilistic routing and epidemic routing. While main-
taining a lower overhead than either epidemic or probabilistic routing, DSG has managed
to achieve as high a message delivery ratio and as low a delivery time as can be expected.
This will lead to better data aggregation and longer battery life, both of which are primary
goals in modern wireless sensor networks.
There remains further research to consider the implications of alternative merge
methods. The current method using a simple ratio depicting commonality may not be
optimal, and experiments in alternative methods may provide further improvement. It
may also be improved by introducing a load-balancing method to equalize the drain
on commonly used nodes, further improving the network lifespan. Load balancing
techniques can also change the clusterhead, to spread energy drain among the group. A
final improvement to consider is the expansion of this algorithm to include point-to-point
communication, expanding its impact to include a wider range of applications.
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Devices in a mobile ad-hoc environment can follow different movement patterns
based on the application environment. Some environments, such as mass transit systems,
follow regular and predictable patterns. Others, such as an aerial monitoring network, gen-
erally follow random paths. Optimal routing schemes tend to take advantage of informa-
tion regarding movement patterns available in social interaction domains. In a social envi-
ronment like wildlife tracking or monitoring socio-human interactions, the devices and/or
users will follow regular contact habits, tending to encounter social groups in which they
participate. In this paper, by dynamically identifying these groups, the patterns are used to
speed routing through a social environment. When social groups are formed, a probability
based scheme is used to route messages to devices efficiently. This algorithm can be imple-
mented ad null, meaning the devices have no information of their environment, and works




Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) are a collection of computing devices con-
nected through wireless communications, such as Bluetooth or wireless LAN. Each node
in a MANET can move freely throughout the network. In environments with unpredictable
and changing motions, such as wildlife sensors, traditional routing algorithms are ineffec-
tive or inapplicable. In order to address this issue new routing methods have been devel-
oped. These new routing methods are often examples of Delay Tolerant Routing, in which
nodes are able to retain copies of messages and forward them at a more opportune time.
As a rule, routing algorithms are more effective when they rely on information regard-
ing the contact patterns of nodes. Conventional probability based routing scheme assumes
consistent avenues of communication; nodes which interacted with a set group of nodes
in the past will do so again in the future [1]. Similarly, social routing assumes that nodes
assigned to the same social network (classroom, project team, department faculty, etc.) will
regularly interact with members of that social group. To take advantage of the partial ap-
plicability of both social and probability based routing, our grouping method is designed
form social groups based on contact patterns. Once these groups are identified, consistent
routes to nodes are recognized based on the delivery history of a group or node. The new
algorithm, called Dynamic Social Grouping: Node-to-Node (DSG-N2), was based on a
previous algorithm [2] and expanded to include node-to-node capability and improve the
grouping and routing efficiency. The new algorithm was them compared to two well known
algorithms referred to as Epidemic routing [3] and SimBet routing [4]. Results show that
DSG-N2 performs better than both routing algorithms in terms of total message traffic and
delivery time.
The purpose of DSG-N2 is to reliably deliver messages from a node to another us-
ing as few communications as possible. In this network scenario every node is capable
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of movement, due to the host being mobile, and contact between each node is not always
reliable or consistent. This algorithm is designed to identify social groups based solely
on contact patterns between nodes without relying on full knowledge of the network. A
node that is part of multiple identified social groups can suggest that two groups be merged
based on common members and delay between groups. Routing occurs through groups or
nodes that have a high probability of delivering the message, based on previous message
deliveries, to the intended destination node. Simulations with real-world data comparing
DSG-N2 to Epidemic and SimBet routing algorithms show that our Dynamic Social Group-
ing algorithm is superior in terms of delivery ratio and message costs to both (see Section
4 for details). Applications of DSG-N2 include inventory tracking or tracking human inter-




Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN) have received considerable attention from re-
searchers in recent years due to their widespread occurrences in a variety of applica-
tions. Routing and data aggregation are of particular interest as they considerably affect
the longevity of the sensor nodes and the performance of the network as a whole. A survey
of routing techniques for DTNs is presented in [5].
2.1. EPIDEMIC ROUTING
Epidemic routing [3] is designed to route messages through partially connected net-
works in a semi-probabilistic fashion. The routing is done through copying and forwarding
packets to other parts of the network in order to reach more sparse sections. When two
nodes meet any unshared messages are transmitted, and the message’s hop count is incre-
mented. A message is passed until its hop count has reached the max. Through this scheme,
Epidemic routing is able to maximize the amount of messages successfully delivered with-
out taking into account delivery time. This creates a large message overhead, redundantly
transmitting messages throughout the network.
2.2. PROBABILISTIC ROUTING
This scheme is based on individual nodes tracking their probability of delivering a
message successfully to a base station. The version introduced by Yu Wang functions by
individual nodes tracking their performance based on individual messages [1]. Each node
is assigned a probability estimate of successfully delivering a message to the basestation
node, and increases this estimate with successful delivery to nodes with higher probability,
or decreases as messages expire. The probability is therefore based on the contacts of
nodes, and as such works well when nodes follow regular, if not necessarily social, contact
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patterns. The algorithm is therefore an effective routing system, but it only takes advantage
of any data other than past performance.
2.3. PROPHET
A similar routing scheme currently implemented is Probabilistic ROuting Protocol
using History of Encounters and Transitivity [6], introduced initially to allow efficient com-
munications in a sparse environment. Similar in many way to the Probabilistic method in
Section 2.2, this method allows individual nodes to track their contact patterns to other
nodes. Unlike the previous method, it is based not on message performance, but on the
contacts themselves; the nodes will adjust their probability when they meet, whether any
messages are transmitted or not. This method is also an effective algorithm in a sparse
network, but also limits the data it applies to routing decisions.
2.4. BUBBLE RAP
The Bubble-Rap grouping method [7] allocates nodes into social groups based on
direct and indirect contacts. They distribute using a method called k−cliques, in which all
fully connected groups of k members are considered a distinct social group and are then
merged with all other k−cliques which can be reached through k−1 nodes. This provides
an accurate representation of the social groups formed by a set of nodes. However, it relies
on global knowledge of the nodes’ contacts, and it must have them before the algorithm can
create groups. In this sense, k-grouping is neither dynamic nor distributed, which limits it’s
applicability to a MANET.
2.5. SIMBET
The SimBet routing algorithm [4] is similar to DSG-N2 in that it can deliver mes-
sages node to node using social patterns. Nodes engage in ‘conversations’ when they meet
and exchange information about data messages and current neighbors. This information
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is used to determine ‘betweenness’ and ‘similarity’. Betweenness is a measure of how of-
ten a node lies on a path between otherwise unconnected nodes. Similarity is a count of
common neighbors between two nodes. These values can accurately predict which node
is more likely to successfully forward a message to the destination. Both betweenness and
similarity are locally determined; global knowledge of the network is not needed. A notable
disadvantage of SimBet is the amount of messages the aforementioned conversations send
across the network, resulting in significant message traffic and strain on the node’s lim-
ited power supply. Also, relationships between nodes in SimBet are represented as either
in contact or not in contact. More specific and informative bookkeeping, such as percent
of time in contact, would result in a better measure of a node‘s likelihood to forward a
message to the destination.
2.6. SIMBETAGE
Link et al. provides an improvement to the SimBet routing protocol to deal with
more dynamic networks [8]. Using SimBet as a baseline, SimBetAge improves upon it by
adding a ‘freshness’ value, which dictates how often a node A has contacted node B and
changes based on an encounter event or time event. On an encounter the freshness value
will increase by a logistic growth function and on a time step event the freshness value
will decrease in proportion to a exponential decay function. Since this algorithm takes into




DSG-N2 addresses two distinct subproblems. First, given an arbitrary collection of
nodes, the network must recognize cohesive social patterns and identify them as groups,
at the same time distributing this information throughout the network. This network orga-
nization can adjust to reflect changes to the network or to the social patterns of the nodes.
Second, once the groups have been recognized, a route must be identified to deliver mes-
sages to other nodes. The algorithm must minimize the number of message repetitions
while ensuring a high delivery ratio.
3.1. GROUPING
A major advantage this algorithm has over conventional mobile ad-hoc routing meth-
ods is the use of social groups to improve communication throughput. The task of identi-
fying such groups, however, requires knowledge of the nodes that is not present at startup.
3.1.1. Contact Strength. The first task in identifying a social group is to calculate a
metric for the contact frequency two nodes have with one another. The symbol λi, j is used
to represent the contact strength between two nodes. This is measured as a function of the
duration for which two nodes, i and j, were in contact and the time that they were not in
contact. The symbol α is used to determine how much the λ changes based on new data,
mimicking a Markov process. Initially, λi, j will be 0 between all nodes, but when nodes
contact one another, it is recalculated as shown in Eqn 1.
λA,B = (1−α)λA,B +α timecontacttimecontact + timenocontact (1)
3.1.2. Forming New Groups. When the λi, j exceeds or is equal to a threshold ψ,
the nodes identify themselves as being members of the same group. Initially, all groups
will have two members and the cluster head of the group is arbitrarily chosen. The cluster
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head has the power to confirm an invitation for a merge, merge two groups, and send out
kill group messages (see section 3.1.4 for details). The group will also have a probability
assigned to it based on a weighted probability average (more information on this in Section
3.2).
3.1.3. Merging. Nodes regularly review their group listing for potential merges.
When a node determines two groups should merge with one another, a suggestion message
is sent to the cluster head of a group as shown in Figure 3.1(a). The criteria for a suggestion
of a group merge is that the ratio of common members over total unique members is greater
than τ. Once the cluster head receives the suggestion, it uses an up-to-date member list to
determine if the two groups are fit for merging with the same criteria as the joint member.
The cluster head will then send out an invitation message to the other cluster head epidemi-
cally as seen in Figure 3.1(b). Once the other cluster head confirms the ratio it measures the
delay of the invitation message. If the delay is greater than one day, the merge is refused;
otherwise the cluster head sends out a kill message to remove the other group and adds that
group’s member list to its own. This process is detailed in Algorithm 7.
(a) Joint members of the
Dot Group and Stripe Group
send a Suggestion to the
Stripe Cluster head
(b) Stripe Cluster head confirms
the Group Merge and sends
a Confirmation message to the
Dot Cluster head
(c) The Dot Cluster head
confirms again and adds all
Stripe Members to the Dot
Group
Figure 3.1. Three Stages of Merging Groups (figures provided by [2])
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Algorithm 7 Merging Groups
Notation
GroupY , GroupZ - Any social groups in MANET
NodeA - Member of both GroupY and GroupZ
NodeB - Cluster head of GroupY , ClusterheadY
NodeC - Cluster head of GroupZ , ClusterheadZ
τ - Threshold for Merging a Group
MT T - Max Transit Time
Trigger - Periodically in NodeA




|GroupY ⋃GroupZ | > τ then
Send SUGGEST Message to arbitrary Group (GroupY or GroupZ)
end if
end for
Trigger - NodeA contacts NodeB
In NodeA...
for all GroupY which contain both NodeA and NodeB do
if NodeA has Control Messages for GroupY then
NodeA sends Control Messages to NodeB
end if
end for
Nodes pass Control Messages epidemically to all Group Members
Trigger - NodeB receives SUGGEST message




|GroupY ⋃GroupZ | > τ and transit time < MT T then
Send CONFIRMATION Message to all members of GroupZ
end if
end if
The Cluster head confirms the suggestion, and sends a Confirmation to the other group
Trigger - NodeC receives CONFIRMATION message









Send KILL message to GroupY
end if
end if
If both Group Cluster heads approve, the arbitrary group is added to the other, and then
removed.
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3.1.4. Dynamic Grouping. Sometimes a node becomes alienated from a group
because of movement and the contact frequency ratio does not meet the group’s required
value of ψ. In this case a node needs to be removed from that group by sending a resign
message to the cluster head, as shown in Algorithm 8. In order to reduce group fragmenta-
tion the cluster head needs to know about the resignation immediately. Periodically a node
will check to see whether or not it still belongs in a group. When this is done, the node will
calculate its GroupλA,Y , which is the average λA,B between the node and all members of
the group, and compare that value to ψ. If the average is less than ψ the node will send a
message to the cluster head that states that the node is no longer part of the cluster head’s
group. This message removes all information regarding that node from the group, and the
rest of the group must be updated with new group information. Until the update has prop-
agated through the group, the group data is considered fragmented. This process is more
thoroughly explained in Section 3.2.
Algorithm 8 Dynamic Groups
Notation
NodeA - Member of GroupY
NodeB - Cluster head of GroupY , ClusterheadY
NodeListY - All nodes in GroupY
GroupλA,Y - Average Contact Strength between NodeA and NodeListY
ψ - Threshold for Forming a Group
Trigger - NodeA checks it’s groups
In NodeA
GroupλY = Average(λA,Y )
if GroupλY < ψ then
Send RESIGN to NodeB
end if
Trigger - NodeB receives RESIGN from NodeA
NodeListY = NodeListY −NodeA
Update all nodes in GroupY of removal and NodeA
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3.1.5. Group Versions. A major concern when dealing with multiple nodes in a
Delay Tolerant Network is keeping group information up to date and decreasing update
overhead. For instance, assume two nodes of the same social group meet and they wish to
exchange information about the groups they have in common. There would be a problem
if there was no way to track which node has the most up-to-date member list and other
properties specific to the group.
To solve this problem group versions are introduced. Every time contact patterns
change (social patterns) there is a possibility of group membership changing or a group
being removed altogether. If the group information is altered in any way, the cluster head,
which has control of group membership, will update the group information and increment a
version number. A higher version number indicates more recent information. If a node en-
counters another node that has a higher version number then the information is transferred.
This process is further detailed in Algorithm 9
Algorithm 9 Group Updates
Notation
VersionA,Y - Version Number of GroupY kept by NodeA
Trigger - NodeA contacts NodeB
In NodeA
for all GroupY which contains both NodeA and NodeB do
Send VersionA,Y to NodeB
Receive VersionB,Y from NodeB
if VersionA,Y >VersionB,Y then
Send GroupY to NodeB
else if VersionA,Y <VersionB,Y then
Receive GroupY from NodeA






Now that the nodes have been organized into groups this information can be used
to route data to other nodes. Similar to Probabilistic Routing, each node is assigned a
vector of probability values based on the chance that a message is successfully delivered to
another node. In order to transfer a message throughout the network a node will forward
a message to other nodes that have higher probability of delivering the message to the
intended node. DSG-N2 improves upon the Probabilistic model by incorporating group
probabilities. Using group dynamics increases system awareness, in turn improving the
network’s delivery ratio.
3.2.1. Individual Probability. Nodes are initially assigned a default probability
σ. When nodes encounter one another, they compare probabilities to determine routing
(more on this in section 3.2.3). The node with lower probability for a given destination will
forward all messages for that destination to the node with the higher probability. When a
node successfully forwards a message, its probability to the destination is updated. The
rate at which the probability changes is controlled by φ, similar to α’s relation to contact
strength. For details, review Algorithm 10.
In addition to message transmission, individual probability can be updated to reflect
the inability to deliver a message. Messages eventually timeout in a network. When this
happens a node’s probability is decreased. This reflects its inability to transfer a message
to the destination node.
3.2.2. Group Probability. Each node calculates vector of group probabilities, de-
noted as~β, independently based on the contact patterns of that specific node. Group prob-
ability differs among members, but this allows nodes to take into account only neighbors
in the group. Nodes that exist in a common group and are not encountered are estimated
using the current group probability. The procedure begins when NodeA contacts NodeB
and both nodes are in GroupY . The algorithm is a weighted average of the individual prob-
abilities, with the weight determined by the contact strength. Since only the encountered
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Algorithm 10 Calculating Individual Probability
Notation
NodeA, NodeB, NodeC - Nodes in MANET
σA - Individual Probability for NodeA
σB - Individual Probability for NodeB
messagei - Message in MANET
timeSenti - Time messagei was sent
T T L - Parameter determining max duration of messages (time to live)
φ - Control Parameter determining Probability decay ratio
Trigger - NodeA transmits messagei to NodeB
if NodeA can forward messagei to NodeB for NodeC then




Trigger - Periodical maintenance in NodeA
for all messagei in NodeA do





node’s probability is known, the σ of other group members is estimated as the current group
probability. This is simplified and shown in Algorithm 11.
3.2.3. Using Probabilities to Route. When two nodes contact each other, they
independently determine their γ value. This is the joint probability of all the groups they
participate with and their individual probability. The node with the higher value is assumed
to either have more consistent contact with the destination node or to be a member of a
group which has consistent contact. In either event, the node with the lower value transfers
all messages to the node with the higher probability, then updates its individual probability
based on successful delivery of a message. This algorithm is detailed in Algorithm 12.
When adjusting the individual probability of a sending node, the system initially uses
the probability of the receiver. As time elapses, nodes gain more information regarding
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Algorithm 11 Calculating Group Probability
Definition
βY - Group Probability for GroupY
NodeA, NodeB - Nodes in GroupY
Trigger - NodeA contacts NodeB in a group of size 2
NodeA sends σA to NodeB
NodeA receives σB from NodeB





Trigger - NodeA contacts NodeB in a group of size > 2
NodeA sends σA to NodeB
NodeA receives σB from NodeB





their social structure, resulting in a joint probability which can differ from its σ value. For
this reason, the individual probability (Algorithm 10) is adjusted by the γ of the destination
node, rather than the individual probability.
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Algorithm 12 Routing Algorithm
Notation
βA - List of all Group Probabilities in NodeA
jointIndProbA - Group / Individual Probability of NodeA
Trigger - NodeA contacts NodeB
In NodeA jointIndProbA = (1−σA,B)
for all Groups NodeA is a member of do
jointIndProb∗= (1−GroupY )
end for
jointIndProb = (1− jointIndProb)
Transmit jointIndProb to NodeB
Receive jointIndProbB from NodeB
if jointIndProbB > jointIndProbA then
Transmit messages to NodeB
σA,B = (1−φ)σa +φ jointIndProbB
else




4.1. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND EVALUATION
DSG-N2 was first implemented in MATLAB to evaluate the control parameters and as
a proof of concept. After optimal values were determined, the algorithm was implemented
using TOSSIM and a virtual hardware simulation was performed. Data was output from
the simulation depicting the time messages were generated, received, and the packet size
of messages sent at each node to determine power consumption, average delivery time and
delivery ratio. The SimBet and Epidemic Routing Algorithms were also implemented in
the hardware simulation, and the results compared to DSG-N2. Other routing algorithms
were reviewed, but either use previous knowledge of the environment (Bubble Rap [7])
or solve different communication issues (Probabilistic [1] performs node-to-basestation
communications). For these reasons, the SimBet and Epidemic schemes were considered
as comparable algorithms. The control variables tested, along with ideal values identified,
can be found in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1. Variable Reference Chart
Control Variables Range Tested Ideal Value
φ Probability Decay Rate 0.1 - 0.7 0.6
ψ Group Formation Threshold 0.1 - 0.7 0.3
α Contact Decay Ratio 0.1 - 0.7 0.4
Ideal values tested by experimentation
Variables
λ Contact Strength between nodes
σ Node’s Probability of Delivery
β Group’s Probability of Delivery
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4.2. SIMULATION DATA SOURCE
In order to test our algorithm in a simulated environment a record of social interac-
tions was needed. The data used for these simulations originated from the MIT Reality
Dataset [9]. The study tracked 100 nodes (people) with cell phones and Bluetooth de-
vices over the course of nine months. A set of Symbian based phones was programmed
to measure contact data and messages, and participants were asked to carry and use them.
Multiple social patterns developed between participants, which resulted in an ideal data set
for testing social algorithms.
4.3. IMPACT OF α, φ, AND ψ
Based on the simulations (Figure 4.1), when ψ is low the value of α will have no
effect on the delivery ratios, since any node to node contact will result in a new group.
These groups do not accurately reflect social groups formed by nodes, lowering the delivery
ratio. As ψ is increased (Figure 4.2), α will start to behave differently and make the groups
more relevant. Based on current results, no matter the ψ the best φs seem to be midrange.
These φs seem to hold probabilities between nodes at a relevant level. It appears as if upper
and lower bound values of φ holds on to or ignores probability history, respectively.
Regarding delivery time, a low ψ will yield evenly distributed results. This is due
to groups being easy to form and nodes transmitting messages liberally rather than finding
efficient delivery routes. When ψ is increased and φ is low, meaning probability history
is ignored, at any α the delivery time will be lower. The delivery ratio takes a hit due to
contact history being ignored, but the average transmission time is better.
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(a) Message Delivery Ratio (b) Message Delivery Time
Figure 4.1. Impact of α and φ with ψ= .1
(a) Message Delivery Ratio (b) Message Delivery Time
Figure 4.2. Impact of α and φ with ψ= .2
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4.4. COMPARISON OF ROUTING ALGORITHMS
When simulating the Epidemic routing protocol, there were two cases which were
tested, based on propagation distance. The baseline version limited the hopcount to three,
while the full execution had an unlimited hopcount where messages only ceased when they
expired. SimBet was executed with default control parameters, and DSG-N2 with control
parameters of α= 0.4, φ= 0.6, and ψ= 0.3, based on optimal values found in MATLAB
simulations 4. As seen in Figure 4.3(a), DSG-N2 performed much better than both Sim-
Bet and Epidemic Routing. Epidemic underperformed in the TOSSIM environment, due
primarily to realistic implementation of limiting factors such as buffer sizes, message colli-
sion, and limited time to transmit messages. Additionally, the power consumption was far
less using the Dynamic Social Grouping algorithm (Figure 4.3(b)). Similarly, SimBet did
not perform as well in regards to either delivery ratio or power consumption, due primarily
to the disconnected nature of the environment. SimBet would perform optimally in a static





















































































Figure 4.3. Comparison of DSG-N2 Routing, SimBet, and Epidemic Routing
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5. CONCLUSION
Dynamic Social Grouping with Node-to-Node transmissions (DSG-N2) performs
better than SimBet and Epidemic routing in both power consumption and delivery ratio
for the dataset specified by identifying the regular contact groups and routing accordingly.
Using the additional information yields considerable benefits for message delivery in a
social environment.
Future improvements include optimizing the grouping metric even further, meaning
not just based on time, but some other applicable metric. Adding load balancing logic to
move the cluster head around in the group to the most optimal position is another pos-
sible improvement. Different environments can be explored, such as tool sets, datasets,
or devices for DSG-N2. A final improvement would be to make DSG-N2 transparent to
developers, easing implementation in a real world environment.
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Department of Computer Science,
Missouri University of Science and Technology, Rolla, Missouri 65401
When developing and implementing a Mobile Ad Hoc Network, a key characteristic
of the network topology is the mobility pattern of the nodes. Based on the application,
nodes can follow semi-predictable patterns, such as the routes followed by Vehicular Ad
Hoc Networks, or the more strict schedules followed by aerial reconnaissance . Optimal
routing schemes tend to take advantage of any information regarding these contact patterns.
In social environments, such as wildlife tracking or sending messages between humans, the
devices and/or users will follow regular contact habits, tending to encounter social groups
in which they participate. By dynamically identifying these groups, the patterns are used
to optimize routing through a social environment. One of two algorithms can be used to
route messages based on these social groups. Dynamic Social Grouping (DSG), used to
route messages strictly from a node to a basestation, is ideal for gathering sensor data and
updating a shared data cache. In contrast, Dynamic Social Grouping - Node to Node (DSG-
N2) is used to route messages between nodes, generally conventional communications.
Both of these algorithms can be implemented ad null, meaning the devices initially have
no information about their environment, and they work to reduce overhead, message traffic,
and delivery time while maintaining a high delivery ratio.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANETs) are a collection of mobile computing devices
connected through wireless communications, such as Bluetooth or wireless LAN. Each
node in a MANET can move freely throughout the network, generally following the mo-
bility patterns based on the type of device[1] [2]. For sensors in environments with unpre-
dictable and changing motions, such as wildlife sensors [3], traditional routing algorithms
are ineffective or inapplicable. In order to address this issue new routing methods have been
developed. These methods are often examples of Delay-Tolerant Networks (DTN) [4], in
which nodes are able to retain copies of messages and forward them at a more opportune
time. Originally designed to enable interplanetary communications, a DTN functions by
grouping messages into a series of bundles intended for the same destination and routing
each bundle as a single unit rather than as independent packets. The store-and-forward
method enables a message to be delivered even when no immediate path to the destination
exists. A device that is carrying a message will store it in the buffer until a path becomes
available. The routing algorithm works by passing the message through nodes capable of
forwarding the message to the destination. The question of which node is more capable of
this forwarding is the main difference between the various routing algorithms.
As a rule, routing algorithms are more effective when they rely on information re-
garding the contact patterns of nodes. Conventional probability-based routing schemes
assume consistent avenues of communication; nodes that interacted with a set group of
nodes in the past will do so again in the future [5]. Similarly, social routing assumes that
nodes assigned to the same social network (classroom, project team, department faculty,
etc.) will regularly interact with members of that social group [6]. To take advantage of
the partial applicability of both social and probability-based routing, our grouping method
is designed form social groups based on contact patterns. Once these groups are identi-
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fied, consistent routes to nodes are recognized based on the delivery history of a group or
node.
The purpose of a routing algorithm is to deliver messages reliably and efficiently,
which is difficult in networks in which nodes are capable of movement, and contact be-
tween each node is not always reliable or consistent. Both the Dynamic Social Group-
ing (DSG) and DSG - Node to Node (DSG-N2) begin by identifying social groups based
solely on contact patterns between nodes without relying on full knowledge of the network.
Groups are formed based on the assumption that frequent and regular contact occurs within
a group; there is no context regarding the group’s purpose, nor is there pre-identification of
groups. Once the groups are identified, routing occurs based on the type of message sent.
If messages are sent in a node-to-base-station pattern, such as for wildlife sensor collection
or data caching, the DSG algorithm routes messages through consistent nodes and groups.
If messages are sent to individual nodes, such as for conventional message passing, the
DSG-N2 is used. Simulations with real-world data comparing Epidemic and Probabilistic
algorithms were performed, showing that the Dynamic Social Grouping algorithm is supe-
rior in terms of its delivery ratio and message costs (see Section 4 for details). Similarly,
DSG-N2 was then compared to Epidemic routing [7] and SimBet routing [8], the results
of which comparisons are shown in Section 5. These results show that DSG-N2 performs
better than both routing algorithms in terms of total message traffic and delivery time.
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2. BACKGROUND
Delay-Tolerant Networks (DTNs) have received considerable attention from re-
searchers in recent years due to their widespread occurrence in a variety of applications.
Routing and data aggregation are of particular interest as they considerably affect the
longevity of the sensor nodes and the performance of the network as a whole. A survey of
routing techniques for DTNs is presented in [9], and a brief comparison can be found in
Table 2.1.
2.1. EPIDEMIC ROUTING
Epidemic routing [7] is designed to route messages through partially connected net-
works in a semi-probabilistic fashion. Routing is accomplished by copying and forwarding
packets to other parts of the network in order to reach more sparse sections. When two
nodes meet, any unshared messages are transmitted, and the message’s hop count is incre-
mented. A message is passed along until its hop count has reached the max. Through this
scheme, Epidemic routing is able to maximize the amount of messages successfully deliv-
ered but without taking into account delivery time. This creates a large message overhead,
redundantly transmitting messages throughout the network.
2.2. MAXPROP
This variation on a flood based protocol was developed by Burgess et al [10] to prior-
itize the transmission of messages. By adding an intelligent priority to messages, they can
be spread throughout the network such that messages are transmitted more often to their
destination, and dropped from the buffer when the node either will not likely deliver the
messages or another node is more likely. The priority is based on the individual node’s
chance of delivery (as based on past performance), other node’s chance of delivery, and
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how far the message has already spread. This algorithm has higher performance than a
basic implementation of epidemic, although there is significantly greater overhead from a
node gathering data on the network layout.
2.3. PROBABILISTIC ROUTING
This scheme is based on individual nodes tracking their probability of delivering a
message successfully to a base station. The version introduced by Yu Wang functions by
individual nodes tracking their performance based on individual messages [5]. Each node
is assigned a probability estimate of successfully delivering a message to the base-station
node; this estimate increases with successful delivery to nodes with higher probabilities
decreases as messages expire. The probability is therefore based on the contacts of nodes,
and as such works well when nodes follow regular, if not necessarily social, contact pat-
terns. The algorithm is therefore an effective routing system, but it does not take advantage
of past performance data.
2.4. PROPHET
A similar routing scheme currently implemented is Probabilistic ROuting Protocol
using History of Encounters and Transitivity [11], introduced initially to allow efficient
communications in a sparse environment. Similar in many ways to the Probabilistic method
in Section 2.3, this method allows individual nodes to track their contact patterns to other
nodes. Unlike the previous method, it is based not on message performance, but on the
contacts themselves; the nodes will adjust their probability when they meet, whether or not
any messages are transmitted. This method, while also an effective algorithm in a sparse
network, limits the data it applies to routing decisions.
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2.5. BUBBLE RAP
The Bubble-Rap grouping method [12] allocates nodes into social groups based on di-
rect and indirect contacts. These contacts are distributed using a method called k−cliques,
in which all fully-connected groups of k members are considered a distinct social group and
are then merged with all other k− cliques that can be reached through k− 1 nodes. This
provides an accurate representation of the social groups formed by a set of nodes. How-
ever, it relies on global knowledge of the nodes’ contacts, which must be known before the
algorithm can create groups. In this sense, k-grouping is neither dynamic nor distributed,
which limits its applicability to a MANET.
2.6. SOCIALCAST
Costa et al. have described an application using social dynamics for a pub-
lish/subscribe schemata across a wireless sensor network, detailing a SocialCast model
[13] in which nodes are assigned a ’Utility Value’ for each interest in which they partici-
pate, which indicates their routing utility for that group. By separating the routing utility
from group participation, the authors improve the lifespan and routing efficiency of the
wireless nodes. The given algorithm is designed for use across a publish/subscribe model,
as well as a wireless network (as opposed to a sensor network), but it can still serve as a
basis for further research, especially regarding the social dynamics described, such as the
Caveman Model.
2.7. SIMBET
The SimBet routing algorithm [8] is similar to DSG-N2 in that it can deliver mes-
sages node to node using social patterns. Nodes engage in ’conversations’ when they meet
and exchange information about data messages and current neighbors. This information
is used to determine ’betweenness’ and ’similarity’. Betweenness is a measure of how of-
ten a node lies on a path between otherwise unconnected nodes. Similarity is a count of
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common neighbors between two nodes. These values can accurately predict which node
is more likely to successfully forward a message to the destination. Both betweenness and
similarity are locally determined; global knowledge of the network is not needed. A no-
table disadvantage of SimBet is the number of messages the aforementioned conversations
send across the network, resulting in significant message traffic and strain on the node’s
limited power supply. Also, relationships between nodes in SimBet are represented as ei-
ther in contact or not in contact. More specific and informative data, such as the percentage
of time in contact, would result in a better measure of a node’s likelihood of forwarding a
message to the destination.
2.8. SIMBETAGE
Link et al. have improved the SimBet routing protocol to handle more dynamic net-
works [14]. SimBetAge improves upon the baseline established by SimBet by adding a
’freshness’ value, which dictates how often node A contacts node B and changes based on
an encounter event or a time event. During an encounter, the freshness value will increase
by a logistic growth function, and during a time step event, the freshness value will de-
crease in proportion to an exponential decay function. This algorithm considers temporal
changes in the network, thereby allowing more reliable and direct routing to occur.
2.9. DISTRIBUTED CLUSTERING
A method based on identifying mobile clusters was researched by Dang et al [15].
This method uses exponentially weighted moving averages (ENWA) to track how similar
the mobility patterns of two nodes are, under the assumption that two nodes moving in
similar patterns are part of the same cluster. When the contact probability between two
nodes exceeds a certain threshold, a new cluster is formed, while if a node’s contact prob-
ability with all group members is high enough, it joins the cluster. Routing is based on a
series of identified gateway nodes, which act as liaisons between two clusters. The routing
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algorithm varies on the relationship between the nodes; two nodes of the same group will
simply hold the message until direct contact is established, while neighbouring groups will
route through a ’gateway’ node, dedicated to transmitting messages to nearby groups. This
algorithm is similar to DSG in many respects, with the main difference being a node’s rela-
tion to the group. While routing in Distributed Clustering is based almost entirely on group
membership, DSG integrates a node’s independent routing ability with that of groups.
Table 2.1. Routing Algorithm Comparison





Epidemic Forward messages to all avail-
able nodes
Reactive No Yes
MaxProp Message priority for epidemic
transmission / dropping
Proactive No Yes
PRoPHET Monitor node contact to mea-
sure delivery probability
Proactive No No
Probabilistic Record message performance
to measure delivery probability
Reactive No No
SimBet Identify central & similar nodes Proactive Yes No





Identify clusters of nodes based






Identify social groups of nodes,





Both DSG and DSG-N2 address two distinct subproblems. First, given an arbitrary
collection of nodes, the network must recognize cohesive social patterns and identify them
as groups, while simultaneously distributing this information throughout the network. This
network organization can adjust to reflect changes to the network or to the social patterns
of the nodes. Second, once the groups have been recognized, a route must be identified
to deliver messages to other nodes. The algorithm must minimize the number of message
repetitions while ensuring a high delivery ratio.
3.1. GROUPING
A major advantage that this algorithm has over conventional mobile ad hoc routing
methods is the use of social groups to improve communication throughput. The task of
identifying such groups, however, requires knowledge of the nodes that is not present at
startup.
3.1.1. Contact Strength. The first task in identifying a social group is to calculate
a metric for the contact frequency between two nodes. The symbol λi, j, used to represent
the contact strength between two nodes, is measured as a function of the duration for which
two nodes, i and j, were in contact and not in contact. The symbol α is used to determine
the extent to which λ changes based on new data, mimicking a Markov process. Initially,
λi, j will be 0 between all nodes, but when nodes contact one another, it is recalculated as
shown in Eqn 1.
λA,B = (1−α)λA,B +α timecontacttimecontact + timenocontact (1)
3.1.2. Forming New Groups. When λi, j exceeds or is equal to a threshold ψ, the
nodes identify themselves as members of the same group. Initially, all groups have two
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members, and the head of the group is chosen arbitrarily. The group head has the power to
confirm an invitation for a merge, merge two groups, and send out kill group messages (see
section 3.1.4 for details). The group will also have a probability assigned to it based on a
weighted probability average (see Section 3.2 for additional information).
3.1.3. Merging. Groups grow larger when two existing groups with shared members
merge. The nodes regularly review their group listings for potential merges. When the
number of common members shared by two groups is greater than the merge threshold
τ, a suggestion message is sent to the head of a group, as shown in Figure 3.1(a). Once
the group head receives the suggestion, it uses an up-to-date member list to determine if
the two groups are fit for merging with the same criteria as the joint member. The group
head will then send out an invitation message to the other group head epidemically, as seen
in Figure 3.1(b). Once the other group head confirms the ratio, it measures the delay of
the invitation message. If the delay is greater than a certain period, the merge is refused;
otherwise, the group head sends out a kill message to remove the other group and adds that
group’s member list to its own. This process is detailed in Algorithm 13.
(a) Joint members of the
Dot Group and Stripe Group
send a suggestion to the
Stripe Group head
(b) Stripe Group head con-
firms the group merge and
sends a confirmation mes-
sage to the Dot Group head
(c) The Dot Group head
confirms again and adds all
Stripe members to the Dot
Group
Figure 3.1. Three stages of merging groups (figures provided by [16])
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Algorithm 13 Merging Groups
Notation
GroupY , GroupZ - Any social groups in MANET
NodeA - Member of both GroupY and GroupZ
NodeB - Group head of GroupY , GroupHeadY
NodeC - Group Head of GroupZ , GroupHeadZ
τ - Threshold for Merging a Group
MT T - Max Transit Time
Trigger - Periodically in NodeA




|GroupY ⋃GroupZ | > τ then
Send SUGGEST Message to arbitrary Group (GroupY or GroupZ)
end if
end for
Trigger - NodeA contacts NodeB
In NodeA...
for all GroupY which contain both NodeA and NodeB do
if NodeA has Control Messages for GroupY then
NodeA sends Control Messages to NodeB
end if
end for
Nodes pass Control Messages epidemically to all Group Members
Trigger - NodeB receives SUGGEST message




|GroupY ⋃GroupZ | > τ and transit time < MT T then
Send CONFIRMATION Message to all members of GroupZ
end if
end if
The Group Head confirms the suggestion, and sends a Confirmation to the other group
Trigger - NodeC receives CONFIRMATION message









Send KILL message to GroupY
end if
end if
If both Group Heads approve, the arbitrary group is added to the other, and then removed.
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3.1.4. Dynamic Grouping. Due to changing social patterns, nodes can become
alienated from a group. Such alienation is discovered by a node periodically reviewing its
group list and determining whether or not the contact frequency ratio meets the group’s
required value of ψ. If not, the node must be removed from that group by sending a resign
message to the group head, as shown in Algorithm 14. To determine whether a node should
resign, it periodically calculates its GroupλA,Y , which is the average λA,B between itself
and all members of the group, and compares that value to ψ. If the average is less than
ψ, the node will send a resignation message to the group head. In order to reduce group
fragmentation, the resignation is not recognized until the group head receives the message
and then propagates a group update through all members. Until the update has propagated
through the group, the group data is considered fragmented.
Algorithm 14 Dynamic Groups
Notation
NodeA - Member of GroupY
NodeB - Group Head of GroupY , GroupHeadY
NodeListY - All nodes in GroupY
GroupλA,Y - Average Contact Strength between NodeA and NodeListY
ψ - Threshold for Forming a Group
Trigger - NodeA checks it’s groups
In NodeA
GroupλY = Average(λA,Y )
if GroupλY < ψ then
Send RESIGN to NodeB
end if
Trigger - NodeB receives RESIGN from NodeA
NodeListY = NodeListY −NodeA
Update all nodes in GroupY of removal and NodeA
3.1.5. Group Versions. An ongoing issue when using dynamic groups is transmit-
ting group membership changes to all members of that group. Data fragmentation occurs
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whenever two nodes, members of the same social group, have different data regarding that
group’s membership. To prevent this issue, all changes are controlled by the group’s head.
This node, arbitrarily chosen, holds the group’s master member list.
Social patterns changing or being revealed will cause changes to a group’s member-
ship, as defined in Sections 3.1.3 and 3.1.4. The group head will increment the version
value of the group as changes are made, including merges and resignations from the group.
Whenever two members of the same group meet, they compare the version number of their
local copy of the group. The higher version number is the one whose information regarding
the group came from the group head more recently. This information is copied over to the
less recent node, along with the version number. This process is detailed in Algorithm 15.
Algorithm 15 Group Updates
Notation
VersionA,Y - Version Number of GroupY kept by NodeA
Trigger - NodeA contacts NodeB
In NodeA
for all GroupY which contains both NodeA and NodeB do
Send VersionA,Y to NodeB
Receive VersionB,Y from NodeB
if VersionA,Y >VersionB,Y then
Send GroupY to NodeB
else if VersionA,Y <VersionB,Y then
Receive GroupY from NodeA





Having organized the nodes into social groups, the algorithm can now use this in-
formation to route data to the destination, which is either the basestation or another node.
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The probability σ is assigned to each node, depicting an estimate of its ability to transmit
a message. This metric is changed to reflect changes in the message delivery or contact
patterns, as described below.
3.2.1. Basestation Routing. Basestation routing is based on nodes gathering data
and then transmitting that data to the nearest basestation. No other messages are transmitted
in this architecture - nodes receive no feedback, nor do they send messages to each other.
Nodes initially are assigned a default probability σ, while base stations are assigned a
probability of 100%. When two nodes encounter one another, they compare probabilities
to determine routing. The member with the lower probability will forward all its messages
to the other before updating its σ to reflect the ability of the node to deliver either directly
or indirectly to a base station. The result is that nodes with immediate access to a base
station achieve a higher probability, and the probability cascades outwards through node
contacts. The cascade rate is determined by a control variable α, which is similar to φ in
that it controls how quickly the probability changes based on new data. For example, when
NodeA transmits a message to NodeB...
σA = (1−φ)σA +φσB (2)
To reflect a given node’s inability to transmit messages, the algorithm also decays
σ. When a message is transmitted to a node, it logs the reception time. If a node holds a
message for a certain duration without transmitting it, its probability is reduced, again in
ratio to φ.
σA = (1−φ)σA (3)
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This can result in a message lowering its probability below that of neighboring nodes.
For example, if NodeA receives a message, it logs the time and compares its probability
(55%) to that of its neighbors (40%). The neighbor nodes are less likely to deliver the
message, so NodeA holds the message, slowly lowering the probability as time passes.
If NodeA never encounters another node, eventually its probability will drop below that
of the neighboring nodes, at which point the message will be transmitted. The result of
this algorithm is that the probability will be reduced if a node is incapable of delivering a
message in a timely manner.
3.2.2. Node-to-Node Routing. Although the algorithm for routing messages to
nodes is larger than that used in base-station routing, requiring more space and more pro-
cessing power, the two are not substantially different. The routing probability metric is
a vector of numbers, one for each node. There are two possible methods by which to
determine a node’s ability to transmit a message to a destination node. The first, called
Performance-Based Probability, is based on the assumption that nodes that have success-
fully delivered a message are more likely to do so again. When nodes transmit messages to
the destination or to nodes with a higher probability, they increase the probability metric.
The Contact-Based Probability method ignores the message history in favor of the node’s
contact patterns.
3.2.3. Performance-Based Probability. This algorithm (Algorithm 16) is similar
to base-station routing in that a node’s probability metric σ is updated to reflect its ability or
inability to transmit a message. When a node successfully transmits a message to another
node with a higher probability, the first node’s probability of delivery is increased to reflect
this.
In addition to message transmission, a node’s individual probability can be updated
to reflect its inability to deliver a message. Messages eventually time out in a network,
which reduces a node’s probability, thereby reflecting its inability to transfer a message to
the destination node.
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This algorithm is best used in a high-traffic environment because less message traffic
can result in an inaccurate σ. It functions well when nodes are heterogenous because,
by tracking the message performance, the algorithm does not assume that all nodes react
identically to messages.
Algorithm 16 Performance Based Probability
Notation
NodeA, NodeB, NodeC - Nodes in MANET
σA,B - Probability of NodeA to deliver a message to NodeB
messagei - Message in MANET
timeRcvdi - Time messagei was received at current node
T T L - Parameter determining duration of messages (time to live)
φ - Control Parameter determining Probability decay ratio
Trigger - NodeA transmits messagei to NodeB
if NodeB is destination of messagei then
σA,C = (1−φ)σA,C +φ
else
σA,C = (1−φ)σA,C +φσB,C
timeRcvdi = timecurrent
end if
Trigger - Periodical maintenance in NodeA
for all messagei in NodeA do





3.2.4. Contact-Based Probability. This method is more useful in an environment
with lower message traffic or uniform message failure probabilities. Using this scheme,
the probability is based on contact with other nodes, rather than message transmission
(Algorithm 17). Upon contact, the probability increases (the exact increase is a function of
φ and the time the nodes spend in contact with each other). This is shown in equation 4.
σA,B = σA,B +(1−σ)φ (4)
In addition, nodes increase their probability when they encounter other nodes capable
of transmitting messages to a destination. This method, called either transitive probability
or indirect contact, occurs when two nodes encounter each other and then. After adjusting
their probability to deliver to each other, they adjust the probabilities of all other nodes.
The control variable β is used to determine the impact of transitive probability, as seen in
equation 5.
σA,B = σA,B +β(1−σA,B)σA,CσC,B (5)
Finally, to ensure that the probability decays for two nodes not in contact for extended
durations, a decay is implemented. Periodically, the node adjusts its probabilities based on
the decay variable γ. A higher γ indicates that the environment should remain relatively
stable for extended durations.
σA,B = σA,Bγ (6)
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Algorithm 17 Contact Based Probability
Notation
NodeA, NodeB, NodeC - Nodes in MANET
σA,B - Probability of NodeA to deliver a message to NodeB
φ - Control Parameter determining direct probability impact
β - Control Parameter determining transitive probability impact
γ - Control Parameter determining Probability decay ratio
Trigger - NodeA comes into contact with NodeB
σA,B = σA,B +(1−σ)φ
for all NodeC in environment do
σA,C = σA,C +β(1−σA,C)σA,BσB,C
end for
Trigger - Periodical maintenance in NodeA




3.2.5. Group Probability. The group probability, depicted as ρY , is a given node’s
estimate of a group’s ability to deliver a message. This is the estimated average probability
of delivery, based on the node members encountered frequently by the node. This method
begins when NodeA contacts NodeB and both are in GroupY . As the σ for all other nodes in
GroupY are unknown, they are assumed to be the current ρY . This method then calculates
the average probability of all members of the group based on previous ρY , σA, and σB, as
detailed in Algorithm 18.
Each node will encounter different nodes in a group, so it is likely that different group
members will have different estimates of that group’s probability. Because group member-
ship is kept current with dynamic grouping, a group’s ρ will still be a reasonable estimate
of the group’s actual probability of delivering, with added emphasis on the members of the
group that a given node is likely to encounter.
Algorithm 18 Calculating Group Probability
Definition
ρY - Group Probability for GroupY
Trigger - NodeA contacts NodeB
NodeA sends σA to NodeB
NodeA receives σB from NodeB
for all GroupY which contain NodeB and NodeA do
ρY = σA+σB+ρY×(|GroupY |−2)|GroupY |
end for
3.2.6. Using Probabilities to Route. When two nodes contact each other, they
independently determine their γ value. This is considered the cahnce of either the node
itself or any of the groups it participates in successfully deliverying the message. The
simplest method to calculate it is the inverse of the probability that all groups fail. The
node with the higher value is assumed to either have more consistent contact with the
base station or to be a member of a group that has consistent contact. In either event, the
85
node with the lower value transfers all messages to the node with the higher probability,
and it then (if it is using Performance-Based Probability) updates its individual probability
based on the successful delivery of a message. The basestation version of this algorithm is
detailed in Algorithm 19. To expand on it for node-to-node routing, it is repeated for all
destination nodes in either buffer.
Algorithm 19 Routing Algorithm
Notation
ρNodeA - List of all Group Probabilities in NodeA
γA - Composite Probability of NodeA
Trigger - NodeA contacts NodeB
In NodeA
γA = 1− (1−σA)×∏(1−ρNodeA)
Transmit γA to NodeB
Receive γB from NodeB
if γB > γA then
Transmit messages to NodeB
σA = (1−α)σa +αγB
else
Receive messages from NodeB
end if
3.3. HYBRID DSG-N2 / EPIDEMIC ROUTING
As an alternative to a composite probability based on the groups in which a node
participates, the routing algorithm can route through all members of a group containing
the destination node. When the message initially is sent, it is routed ’near’ the destination
node by a probabilistic method. Upon finding a member of the same social group as the
destination, the message is routed epidemically to all members of that group, quickly ar-
riving at the destination. This algorithm is designed to achieve the high delivery ratio and
low delivery time of epidemic by ensuring that all nodes that come into contact with the
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destination have a copy for delivery, while reducing the number of redundant copies by
only transmitting a single copy around nodes not in contact.
This algorithm (Alg 20) functions best when the identified social groups have a high
correlation with the contact patterns. If the groups are too large, then the number of redun-
dant messages increases the transmission costs, overloads buffers, and causes transmission
collisions. If the groups are too small, then the algorithm functions the same as PRoPHET,
ignoring any available social data.
Algorithm 20 Hybrid Algorithm
Notation
BuddyListA - List of nodes that are in same group as NodeA
GroupX - Group containing NodeA
σA,B - NodeA probability to deliver to NodeB
σˆA - Vector of NodeA probability to all other nodes
desti - Destination node of msgi
Trigger - NodeA contacts NodeB
In NodeA
BuddyListA = /0
for all GroupX ∈ NodeA do
BuddyListA = BuddyListA∪Members of GroupX
end for
Send BuddyListA, σˆA to NodeB
Receive BuddyListB, σB
for all msgi in NodeA do
if desti ∈ BuddyListB then
Transmit msgi to NodeB
else if σA,desti < σB,desti then




4. ANALYSIS - DSG
4.1. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND EVALUATION
To evaluate this algorithm and the impact of control variables, a simulation was de-
signed and implemented using MATLAB. Once the routing efficiency was determined, a
power consumption comparison was performed in NesC using a TOSSIM simulator mod-
ified with PowerTossim Z. For comparison, both simulations also ran Epidemic Routing
and base Probabilistic Routing schema. Epidemic Routing is considered the ideal in terms
of the message transmission time and delivery ratio, and is therefore used for comparison,
while Probabilistic Routing represents an improvement over Epidemic Routing in terms of
the resources used. Other comparable algorithms were reviewed, but they either use previ-
ous knowledge of the environment (such as Bubble Rap) or are targeted to solve different
communication issues (Simbet performing node-to-node communication, and SocialCast
performing publish/subscribe broadcasts). For these reasons, the Probabilistic and Epi-
demic schemas were chosen as comparable algorithms. The control variables tested, along
with ideal values identified, can be found in Table 4.1.
4.2. SIMULATION DATA SOURCE
To implement this algorithm accurately, the node contacts must follow social
patterns. Potential sources of this information include real-life tracking data or the results
from a social prediction algorithm, such as the Caveman Model. For this reason, the
simulation utilized data obtained from an experiment conducted by the University of
Cambridge at the 2005 Grand Hyatt Miami IEEE Infocom conference. Participants were
asked to carry iMotes with them during the conference for 3 to 4 days to capture social
interaction data [17]. Although the experiment did not include base stations capable of
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Table 4.1. Variable Reference Chart
Control Variables Range Tested Ideal Value
α Contact Decay Ratio 0.1 - 0.7 0.4
φ Contact Impact on Probability 0.1 - 0.7 0.6
β Transitive Impact on Probability (CBP) 0 - .5 .015
γ Probability Decay (CBP) .95 - .999 .998
ψ Group Formation Threshold 0.1 - 0.7 0.3
τ Group Merge Threshold 0.1 - 0.33 0.3
Ideal values tested by experimentation
Variables
λ Contact Strength between nodes
σ Node’s Probability of Delivery
β Group’s Probability of Delivery
γ Composite Probability
collecting information, they did include static, immobile nodes. For simulation purposes,
these units were treated as data sinks.
4.3. IMPACT OF α AND ψ
Based on the utilized dataset, the α setting is directly influenced by the dynamic na-
ture of the contact patterns. In both long-range simulations and simulations in which nodes
consistently follow similar contact patterns, a lower α value can result in more effective
simulations. In contrast, a higher α results in the algorithm placing more weight on recent
data. If the probability is more dynamic, it can more rapidly respond to changes in the
layout.
The ψ setting influences the ease with which the nodes form social groups. In an
environment in which nodes only encounter other nodes in the same social group, a lower
value can result in the network being rapidly organized, whereas a higher ψ results in
groups forming slowly, and only with regular contacts.
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The results (as shown in Figure 4.1) indicate a peak Message Delivery Ratio as α de-
creases and ψ increases. The lower α seems to be due to the large amount of ’garbage’ data
- a node that successfully delivers to the base station is quite likely just passing through and
will not likely serve as a good long-range contact. A lower α allows the algorithm to ignore
these incidental contacts and concentrate on nodes that deliver successfully with regularity.
Similarly, the ψ peak value is based on ignoring the large number of casual contacts. Be-
cause this dataset was gathered at a conference, there are several regular contacts between

























































































(c) Admin Message Traffic
Figure 4.1. Impact of α and ψ
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4.4. IMPACT OF τ AND φ
The control variable τ represents the level of similarity necessary for groups to merge.
A higher τ value results in fewer groups merging and maintains a small group size, but it
does not influence the number of groups being created. A higher τ value will result in
several smaller groups. Due to the ratio needed to ensure that any group merges occur, the
maximum value for τ is 13 . If it is higher, the initial 2-member groups will not have enough
common members to merge.
The contact deterioration φ determines how quickly the contact strength changes over
time. A higher φ value results in the contact strength changing more rapidly. Higher values
would be used in more dynamic environments, so the nodes’ contact strengths are influ-
enced more by recent events than historical data. This value is closely linked to the ψ value
given earlier; a more rapidly-changing contact strength results in a lower required value of
ψ to successfully form groups.
The results, as shown in Figure 4.2, indicate that the algorithm functions best when
the τ value is nearly, but not quite, at its maximum. A τ of 0.3 allows groups to merge
regularly, reflecting larger groups while still ignoring the casual group affiliations. Simi-
larly, the φ results show peak functionality at 0.3, although this may be due to the ψ value
already inserted. These metrics show the largest increase in the delivery ratio, but with a
corresponding increase in the average message delivery time (Figure 4.2(b)). These obser-
vations are due to this time reflecting only delivered messages; by increasing the number
of delivered messages, the system includes several messages that were ignored.
4.5. COMPARISON OF ROUTING ALGORITHMS
A review of the results (Figure 4.3) shows that the DSG Routing Scheme performs
better than the Probabilistic Scheme in all metrics and is comparable to Epidemic Routing
in terms of both the delivery ratio and delivery time while having considerably less message


















































































(c) Admin Message Traffic
Figure 4.2. Impact of τ and φ
provided at the conference was ideal for forming short-term dynamic groups. In contrast,
the Probabilistic Scheme had difficulty adjusting to the social groups that formed and took
too long to cascade the probabilities that would result from successful delivery. The results
indicate that DSG is comparable to the ideal routing method, and with considerably less
cost.
A cost comparison of the algorithms was performed in the TOSSIM simulation
using the PowerTOSSIMZ [18] model, as shown in Figure 4.4. The baseline shown in the
graph indicates the simulation’s power consumption when no routing occurs and serves
as a comparison point. We use this to find that the Dynamic Social Grouping’s cost is




















Comparison of Message Delivery Ratio
























Comparison of Message Delivery Time


















Comparison of Total Message Traffic
(c) Total Message Traffic
Figure 4.3. Comparison of DSG, Probabilistic, and Epidemic for Base-Station Routing
the overhead from group management, such as group merge invitations, suggestions,
and membership updates, but not standard maintenance, such as neighbour discovery or
message generation.
When considering a routing algorithm for large-scale deployment, there is always
concern regarding how well the algorithm scales to a higher number of nodes. For this
reason, scalability experiments were performed to investigate how well the DSG algorithm
performs with different numbers of nodes. Because the experiment was performed using a
real-world dataset, it is impossible to add additional nodes to the experiment, but relatively
simple to randomly remove nodes from consideration. The results show that the ratios from
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Figure 4.4. Comparison of DSG, Probabilistic, and Epidemic Power Consumption
the three algorithms tend to increase as the number of nodes increases, improving connec-
tivity, but the DSG algorithm does not show a marked improvement until the full 40 nodes
are in use (Figure 4.5(a)). This is because the same control variables are used throughout
the entire experiment set, from 5 to 40 nodes. As indicated earlier, the algorithm is sensitive
to the control variables used during execution (detailed in Table 4.1); using these variables
despite the different environments causes performance to fluctuate wildly. Nonetheless, the
cost of this system remains consistently lower than the alternatives (Figure 4.5(b)) because
of the nature of the administration traffic. As the number of nodes decreases, reducing node
connectivity, the administration overhead also decreases. Fewer groups are being formed,
merged, or updated. As the connectivity increases, the routing performance improves by
enough to offset the overhead.
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(a) Comparison of Delivery Probability versus
Node Count
(b) Comparison of Total Message Traffic versus
Node Count
Figure 4.5. Scalability Experiments
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5. ANALYSIS - DSG-N2
5.1. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND EVALUATION
DSG-N2 was first implemented in MATLAB to evaluate the control parameters and
as a proof of concept. After optimal values were determined, the algorithm was imple-
mented using TOSSIM, and a virtual hardware simulation was performed. Data were out-
put from the simulation depicting the time at which messages were generated and received,
the packet size of messages sent at each node to determine power consumption, the average
delivery time and the delivery ratio. The SimBet and Epidemic Routing Algorithms also
were implemented in the hardware simulation, and the results were compared to DSG-N2.
Other routing algorithms were reviewed, but they either use previous knowledge of the en-
vironment (Bubble Rap [12]) or solve different communication issues (Probabilistic [5],
which performs node-to-base-station communications). For these reasons, the SimBet and
Epidemic schemes were chosen as comparable algorithms.
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5.2. SIMULATION DATA SOURCE
In order to test our algorithm in a simulated environment, a record of social inter-
actions was needed. The data used for these simulations originated from the MIT Reality
Dataset [19]. The study tracked 100 nodes (people) with cell phones and Bluetooth devices
over the course of 9 months. A set of Symbian-based phones was programmed to measure
contact data and messages, and participants were asked to carry and use them. Multiple so-
cial patterns developed between participants, which resulted in an ideal dataset for testing
social algorithms.
5.3. IMPACT OF α, φ, AND ψ
Based on the simulations, when ψ is low (Figure 5.1), the value of α will have no
effect on the delivery ratios because any node-to-node contact will result in a new group.
These groups do not accurately reflect social groups formed by nodes, thus lowering the
delivery ratio. As ψ increases (Figure 5.2), α will begin to behave differently and make
the groups more relevant. Based on current results, the best φ values seem to be midrange
because such values appear to hold probabilities between nodes at a relevant level. Con-
versely, it appears as if upper and lower bound values of φ hold onto or ignore the proba-
bility history, respectively.
Regarding delivery time, a low ψ will yield evenly-distributed results. This is due
to groups forming easily and nodes transmitting messages liberally rather than finding ef-
ficient delivery routes. When ψ is increased and φ is low, meaning that the probability
history is ignored, the delivery time will be lower at any α. The delivery ratio suffers due
to the contact history being ignored, but the average transmission time is better.
97
(a) Message Delivery Ratio (b) Message Delivery Time
Figure 5.1. Impact of α and φ with ψ= .1
(a) Message Delivery Ratio (b) Message Delivery Time
Figure 5.2. Impact of α and φ with ψ= .2
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5.4. COMPARISON SIMULATIONS
With ideal control parameters tested, a simulation to compare the routing algorithms
was implemented. Epidemic and PRoPHET were implemented as a baseline comparison
and compared to DSG-N2 using both the Performance-Based Probability and the Contact-
Based Probability. In addition, the Hybrid Algorithm was tested. The results, as presented
in Figure 5.3, show that the Hybrid Method generally has the best tradeoff. While Epi-
demic’s delivery ratio of 95.5% is slightly higher than Hybrid’s 94.1%, it achieves this
ratio at the expense of 4 times as many message transmissions. In contrast, the PBP ver-
sion of DSG-N2 is by far the least burdensome to use, requiring only 22,797 transmissions
over a simulated 9 months, as opposed to PRoPHET’s 53,874. This performance bene-
fit has a tradeoff of a lower delivery ratio. These results are based on a relatively lower
message count - 6,400 messages constitute a poor basis of probability. In conclusion, the
Hybrid transmits the most messages, while the Performance-Based Probability is the most
energy efficient.
(a) Message Delivery Ratio (b) Message Delivery Time (c) Total Message Traffic




To validate the above simulations, the algorithms were simulated in a TOSSIM en-
vironment. This simulation tool allows individual nodes to track additional factors, such
as buffer overflow, message collision, and power consumption. Although it is infeasible to
implement for more complicated algorithms, it was used to validate the above results in a
realistic environment.
When simulating the Epidemic routing protocol, two cases were tested based on the
propagation distance. The baseline version limited the hop count to three, while the full
execution had an unlimited hop count for which messages only ceased when they expired.
SimBet was executed with default control parameters, and DSG-N2 with control parameters
of α= 0.4, φ= 0.6, and ψ= 0.3, based on optimal values found in MATLAB simulations.
As seen in Figure 5.4, DSG-N2 performed much better than both SimBet and Epidemic
Routing. Epidemic underperformed in the TOSSIM environment due primarily to the real-
istic implementation of limiting factors such as buffer sizes, message collision, and limited
message transmission time. Additionally, the Dynamic Social Grouping algorithm con-
sumed far less power (Figure 5.4(b)). Similarly, SimBet did not perform as well in regards
to both the delivery ratio and power consumption due primarily to the disconnected na-
ture of the environment. SimBet would perform optimally in a static or strongly connected
environment, which does not apply to the real-world dataset used.
5.6. COMPARISON TO ORACLE
The ideal routing algorithm will make its decision based on total knowledge of fu-
ture events. Its ability to identify the shortest, most reliable route makes the Oracle routing
algorithm a useful comparison tool for other algorithms [20]. Although impossible to im-
plement in real life, it is possible to use Oracle in simulation to compare its ideal routes to
another algorithm’s estimates. During simulation, measurements were taken periodically to








































(a) Message Delivery Ratio (b) Power
Figure 5.4. Comparison of DSG-N2 Routing, SimBet, and Epidemic Routing
ments were taken during DSG-N2 simulations to identify what the algorithm identified as
the ideal path. For comparison, PRoPHET also was submitted to identify which nodes were
more capable of delivering a message. The lists then were compared to identify how many
’swaps’ would be necessary to make the probability metrics identical to the ideal case; a
higher swap count indicates that the simulations did not reflect an accurate measurement
of ’real’ probability. The results, shown in Figure 5.5, show that the DSG-N2 matches the
ideal Oracle routing scheme, having a value equal to Oracle’s ideal route in 86.23% of the
cases, as opposed to PRoPHET’s 64.98%.
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Figure 5.5. Comparison of DSG-N2 and PRoPHET to Oracle
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6. CONCLUSION
The Dynamic Social Grouping (DSG) algorithm has been shown to provide a signifi-
cant increase in efficiency over Probabilistic routing and Epidemic routing, while Dynamic
Social Grouping with Node-to-Node Transmissions (DSG-N2) performs better than Sim-
Bet and Epidemic routing in an applicable social environment. While maintaining a lower
overhead, the grouping methods described achieve as high a message delivery ratio and as
low a delivery time as can be expected. This will lead to better data aggregation and longer
battery life, both of which are primary goals in modern wireless sensor networks.
Further research remains to be conducted to consider the implications of alternative
merge methods. The current method using a simple ratio depicting commonality may not
be optimal, and experiments in alternative methods may provide further improvement. The
current method may also be improved by introducing a load-balancing method to equal-
ize the drain on commonly-used nodes, further improving the network’s lifespan. Load-
balancing techniques also can change the clusterhead to distribute the energy drain among
the group. A final improvement to consider is the expansion of this algorithm to include
point-to-point communication, allowing it to impact a wider range of applications.
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IV. Three Point Encryption (3PE) - Secure Communications in Delay Tolerant
Networks
Roy Cabaniss, Vimal Kumar, and Sanjay Madria
Department of Computer Science
Missouri University of Science & Technology, Rolla, Missouri 65401
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANET) are a subset of Delay Tolerant Networks
(DTNs) composed of several mobile devices. These dynamic environments make con-
ventional security algorithms unreliable; nodes located far apart from each other may not
have access (available) to each other’s public keys or have doubt on validity of the public-
key, making secure message exchange difficult. Furthermore, ad hoc networks are likely
to be highly compromised and therefore may be untrusted. Other security methods, such
as identity-based encryption and Kerberos, rely on requesting key data from a trusted third
party, which can be unavailable or compromised in a DTN-like environment. The purpose
of this paper is to introduce two security overlay networks capable of delivering messages
securely, preventing both eavesdropping and alteration of messages. The first algorithm,
Chaining, uses multiple midpoints to re-encrypt the message for the destination node. The
second, Fragmenting, separates the message key into pieces that are routed and secured
independently from each other. Both techniques improve security in hostile environments;
under test conditions, Chaining reduces the number of messages intercepted by 90%, and
Fragmenting by 83%. This improvement has a performance trade-off, however, reducing
the delivery ratio by 63% in both algorithms.
107
1. INTRODUCTION
Secure communication is a base requirement for many wireless computing applica-
tions. Thus, any effective Delay Tolerant Networking (DTN) implementation must have
a security system capable of routing messages without allowing an adversary to access
or modify those messages. With the advent of public-key cryptography, private commu-
nication without any direct interaction is now feasible by providing the public key over
unsecured networks. To communicate securely, the origin node must verify the key’s as-
sociation with the destination. In conventional communications, this problem is solved by
using a trusted key repository to store and verify the keys used. However, this technique is
infeasible in dynamic DTN in which the trusted party may be unreachable. This limitation
forces nodes to handle their own key distribution and verification [1].
Methods are available that verify a node’s identity, ranging from the very low tech
(physical contact) to the more sophisticated (measuring the performance traits of the de-
vices) [2]. However, these methods require point-to-point contact and therefore are difficult
over any distance. When a node wants to send a message to another in direct contact or
has already stored the destination’s public key, the problem of secure transmission is triv-
ial. However, in a DTN, validation of a public key [3] may not be feasible. Also, in DTN
networks, connections can be short-lived and message delivery may get delayed. Thus,
public keys may be inaccessible or untrusted. In such an environment, a node can encrypt
a message with a key of a trusted node or multiple semi-trusted nodes and these nodes will
be responsible for secure delivery of messages when connections are established. The in-
tent of Three Point Encryption (3PE) is to send a message securely to a destination without
having access to the destination’s public key for reasons explained above. This task is per-
formed by routing the message through the keys of other nodes and asking the midpoint to
re-encrypt the message for the destination node.
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This algorithm could possibly be applied to the task of routing messages securely
through a series of allies (any of whom may or may not be compromised). If a member of
the Red army wishes to communicate securely with another Red, he can do so using his
public key, which he should already have. If he wants to communicate with a member of
the Blue army, however, he may not have the key available or trust the public key. Rather
than wait for direct contact with the destination to obtain the key, he can route the message
through a series of members to ensure its security. Additional applications include a user
in a battlefield trying to communicate when surrounded by untrusted nodes, and secure
interactions between independently deployed wireless sensor fields.
The objective of this paper is to analyze two 3PE schemes: Chaining (Section 3.1)
and Fragmenting (Section 3.2) in a DTN environment for secure delivery of messages. The
chaining algorithm secures messages by sending them through a series of midpoints in the
delay tolerant network; each midpoint must decrypt and re-encrypt the message before for-
warding it to the final destination. Because the message is always encrypted with multiple
layers, no midpoint will have access to the original message. The fragmenting algorithm
functions similarly, sending the message through multiple midpoints in parallel. The mes-
sage is broken into several fragments. Any node attempting to read the original message
must have access to many (although not necessarily all) of the fragments. Simulation results
(shown in Section 6) indicate that these schemes increase security significantly. Chaining
reduces the number of compromised messages by as much as 90%, while fragmenting does




A wide variety of advanced encryption methods are available to enable secure com-
munications. Key distribution techniques give nodes access to public keys in the network.
Our algorithms approach the problem of secure communications by expanding on these
base methods.
2.1. COMMUTATIVE ENCRYPTION
Encryption algorithms, by definition, convert a coherent message into an unreadable
ciphertext. Normally, when two encryption keys can be used on the same message, they
must be encrypted and decrypted in a last-in-first-off order. Otherwise, the result is in-
comprehensible. Commutative encryption is a class of encryption algorithms that can be
applied and removed in an arbitrary order, as shown in Eqn 1.
decA(encB(encA(msg))) = encB(msg) (1)
This class of encryption techniques allows multiple encryptions to be applied to a message,
thereby increasing the security of the system. Sample commutative encryption techniques
include the Shamir algorithm [4], the Massey-Omura algorithm [5], and the El-Gamal re-
encryption scheme[6].
2.2. THRESHOLD ENCRYPTION
Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) are designed to work in unreliable environments
in which messages are corrupted or dropped. While this unreliability can be reduced by
both message replication and resubmission, these solutions complicate security. Alternative
methods can be used to allow a message to be decrypted if portions of the original key are
lost. Using Shamir’s (k,n) scheme [7], a message can be encrypted with n keys, requiring k
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shares to decrypt (where k is always less than or equal to n). This technique allows complex
security systems to be implemented in unreliable networks.
2.3. ONION ROUTING
Onion routing, developed by Syverson et al. [8], allows secure, anonymous commu-
nications in a static network. This method is based on establishing secure communications
through a series of proxies, each of which only knows their incoming and outgoing proxy.
By limiting data, traffic is forwarded without the destination being aware of the source of
the messages, and without any of the nodes along the route being aware of the message’s
contents. This technique has been implemented in the Tor anonymity network, a series of
computers that act as proxies for onion routing. The algorithm cannot be implemented in
a MANET due to the unavailable or untrusted list of secure nodes; however, it serves as
a demonstration of multiple midpoint encryption, which was expanded upon to design the
chaining encryption technique.
2.4. ENPASSANT
Node mobility means that proxies may be unavailable or, at the very least, expensive
to reach when implementing Tor in a DTN. The designers of the EnPassant [9] scheme
expanded on the onion routing scheme with groups of proxies. Both the delivery time and
ratio improve because any group members are allowed to act as a proxy, both decrypting
and forwarding a data stream. Anonymity is preserved by forcing a message to follow
indirect routes. This scheme is functional, but only under certain assumptions regarding
the attacker. First, this scheme is very vulnerable to global eavesdropping adversaries; if
all messages can be followed through the midpoints, randomizing the route has no benefit as
the messages still can be tracked. This is a general weakness among DTN security schemes,
however. A larger issue is that using group keys makes the scheme very vulnerable to
Byzantine attacks [10]. A single compromised node jeopardizes the security of the entire
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group. If a member of each group is compromised, all traffic can be tracked. Despite these
vulnerabilities, this scheme prevents traffic analyses fairly well.
2.5. SOCIAL CONTACTS FOR MESSAGE CONFIDENTIALITY
El Defrawy et al. [11] proposed a method by which to securely communicate mes-
sages in a DTN. With this algorithm, a node lacking the destination’s public key can encrypt
the message with the public keys of several nodes near the destination, in terms of either
physical proximity or contact frequency. While secure, this algorithm has the issue of hav-
ing to maintain contact information for several nodes in the network. Another algorithm
proposed for comparison, the Poor Man’s Approach, fractures the key into several parts.
Each fragment follows a different route to the destination. The random key then is split
into several other sub-keys such that all fragments must be accessed to retrieve the original
message. Using a bitwise XOR is the easiest method (K = K1⊕K2⊕K3...). The encrypted
message and all of the fragments are sent directly to the destination, but with a time lag
so that each fragment will follow a different route. The purpose is to ensure that only the
destination node receives all key fragments. If an adversary can monitor all transmissions
(either by global eavesdropping or by being located on the sole path between the nodes),
it can retrieve the key as easily as the destination can. This method, expanded on by the
3PE algorithm, is simple to implement but is only secure as long as the routing algorithm
forwards each fragment independently. Even with these limitations, these approaches to
keyless secure communication serve as a foundation for future algorithms.
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3. PROPOSED ALGORITHM
The algorithms presented in this section are designed to function in large-scale DTNs.
They assume that the message will be processed by untrusted nodes (hence the need for
encryption at every step). Each node keeps a subset of the public keys available, referred
to as the keychain, maintained by any number of key distribution techniques [13] [14]
[15]. The following subsections describe the algorithms designed to use partial keychains
to improve message confidentiality.
3.1. CHAINING ENCRYPTION
Chaining encryption forces the algorithm to route through k randomly selected nodes,
known as links, without allowing any links to access the plaintext. The original message is
first encrypted with the public key of each link and then routed to the nearest link. At each
link, that node’s encryption layer is removed. If the link has access to the final destination’s
public key, then the message is encrypted with it. Otherwise, the link encrypts the message
for a node in its keychain, adding that node to the link chain. Only when each layer has
been replaced with the final destination’s key can the message be forwarded to the endpoint.
Once there, it is decrypted k times, each time removing a layer of encryption from the
message. Pseudocode for this method can be found in Algorithm 21.
This method is very secure, avoiding pitfalls inherent to the normal key-exchange
sequence and fragmentation method. The only way it can be broken is if all of the links
are compromised by an adversary. Another advantage is that it can be either scaled up
for high-risk networks or down for more casual security by changing the number of links
required. The trade-off is that this algorithm requires a message to travel to numerous
midpoints, increasing the message delivery time considerably. Another trade-off is that
a link compromised by the adversary can stop message delivery. The compromised link
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either can refuse to forward a message or can reencrypt it with its own key. The latter can
allow the adversary to read the message if all of the link’s encryption layers are replaced
with the adversary’s. If the message uses a compromised node as a link, the message cannot
be read by the adversary unless all links are compromised. However, it cannot be read by
the destination either, resulting in a dropped message.
For example, Alice, a member of the Red army, sends a secure message to Bob, a
member of the Blue army. If Alice possesses Bob’s public key, she simply encrypts the
message and forwards it. Failing that, she may attempt normal key distribution techniques,
asking other members of the Red army (who she assumes are trusted) if they have the desti-
nation key. If they do not, she will select two midpoints, Chuck and David (Alice must pos-
sess the public key for both), and encrypt the message for both - encChuck(encDavid(Msg)).
Because she may not trust them, she layers the encryption to ensure that the message cannot
be read by either party. The message is routed to Chuck first simply by virtue of his prox-
imity. Chuck then removes his layer of encryption, leaving encDavid(Msg). Chuck cannot
read the message, so he obeys the protocol, re-encrypts it with Bob’s key, and forwards it to
David - encBob(encDavid(Msg)). David cannot read the message either, so he follows the al-
gorithm, removing his layer of encryption and forwarding it to Bob - encBob(encBob(Msg)).
Once Bob receives the message, he has no problem removing both layers of encryption and
retrieving the original message.
This example of execution changes if one of the midpoints is compromised. If
Chuck had been compromised, he would not have encrypted the message for Bob. Even
if Chuck cannot read the message, he can refuse to forward it, causing the message de-
livery to fail. If he wants to read the message, he can re-encrypt it with the adversary
key and forward it to David - encAdv(encDavid(Msg)). David, in this case, does not pos-
sess Bob’s public key. Thus, he randomly selects midpoint Eric, forwarding the message
on - encEric(encAdv(Msg)). If Eric is compromised and working with Chuck, he can re-
move his layer of encryption and Chuck’s adversary key to retrieve the original message.
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Only through their collaboration can the message be compromised. If Eric is not compro-
mised, he removes his layer of encryption, encrypts the message for Bob, and forwards it
- encBob(encAdv(Msg)). In this case (when a portion of the chain was compromised), the
final intended destination cannot read the message, but neither can the adversary.
The chaining method, therefore, has three possible outcomes. If all midpoints are un-
compromised, the message is delivered successfully and securely. When all members are
both compromised and collaborating, the message is compromised. If some are compro-
mised and some not, or if they are not collaborating, the message delivery fails - a midpoint
either refuses to forward the message or encrypts it with the wrong key. A detailed look at
these relative probabilities is presented in Section 4.
3.2. FRAGMENTING ENCRYPTION
The trade-off for chaining encryption’s increased security is its significantly increased
delivery time. The fragmenting encryption method, rather than sending messages sequen-
tially through links, will fragment the message into different pieces. Using threshold en-
cryption, the message is encrypted into several subkeys. This allows the final destination
to decrypt the message even if fragments are compromised by the adversary or dropped.
Each fragment is encrypted and forwarded through a single link. Because each fragment
is routed through a single midpoint, this technique takes less delivery time than chaining.
Pseudocode for this method can be found in Algorithm 22.
One drawback of the fragmented method is that threshold encryption makes it less
secure than chaining. Also, the adversary can read the original message if enough of the
fragments are sent through compromised nodes. Additionally, because a copy of the mes-
sage must be sent with each fragment, the system’s energy costs are considerably higher.
Section 4 offers detailed information regarding these trade-offs.
A performance weakness in the scheme is that the midpoint is selected randomly from
the available keychain rather than from among those related to either the origin or desti-
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Algorithm 21 Chained Encryption
Notation
k - The number of links through which a message must be routed
NodeOrigin - Origin of msg
msgdest - Final destination of msg
plaintext - Original message to be sent to msgdest
NodeA - Arbitrary node in MANET
KeychainA - Set of Public Keys to which NodeA has access
EncA(text) - Encrypted form of text using public key of NodeA
DecA(text) - Decrypted form of text using private key NodeA
Trigger - NodeOrigin wants to send msg to Nodedest
msgtext ← plaintext
for i = 1→ k do
Nodei← Random Node from KeychainOrigin
msgmid ← msgmid ∪Nodei
msgtext ← EncNodei(msgtext)
/* Message is now encrypted commutatively */
end for
Route to nearest node in msgmid
Trigger - NodeA receives msg
if NodeA = msgdest&&msgmid = /0 then
for i = 1→ k do
msgtext ← Decdest(msgtext)
end for
Message has been delivered
else




/* Since msg was encrypted commutatively,
order of node delivery / decryption is irrelevant */
if msgdest ∈ KeychainA then
msgtext ← Encmsgdest (msgtext)
else
Nodei← Random Node from KeychainA




Route to nearest node in msgmid
end if
116
Algorithm 22 Fragment Encryption
Notation
NodeOrigin - Origin of msg
plaintext - Original message to be sent to msgdest
KeychainA - Set of Public Keys to which NodeA has access
Nodes use T hreshold(k,n) algorithm
EncT HencKeyset(text) - Encrypts text using Threshold encryption.
DecT HdecKeyset(text) - Decrypts text using Threshold encryption.
decKeyset must contain at least k keys of original encKeyset
Keyi - Fragment i of a total of n fragments.
msgFrag - Message Fragment. Contains...
msgFragtext - encrypted original message
msgFragkey - One key for encrypted message
msgFragdest - Final destination of message
msgFragmid - Midpoint of this fragment
RcvdKeys - Keys received by Nodedest , initially /0
Trigger - NodeOrigin wants to send message plaintext to msgdest
Generate random keys {Key1,Key2, ...,Keyn}
for i = 1→ n do
Node j← Random Node from KeychainOrigin
Generate new message fragment msgFrag
/* In message, include encrypted form of original plaintext and Keyi */




Send msgFrag to Node j
end for
Trigger - NodeA receives msgFrag, A = msgFragmid
if msgFragdest ∈ KeyChainA then
msgFragkey← Encdest(DecA(msgkey))
/* At this point, Encdest(DecA(msgkey)) = Encdest(Keyi) */
msgFragmid ← /0
Send msgFrag to Nodedest
else
msgFragmid ← Random Node from KeychainA
msgFragkey← Encmid(DecA(msgkey))
/* At this point, Encmid(DecA(msgkey)) = Encmid(Keyi) */
Send msgFrag to msgFragmid
end if
Trigger - Nodedest receives msgFrag, msgFragmid = /0
RcvdKeys← RcvdKeys∪Decdest(msgFragkey)
if |RcvdKeys|= k then
/* Nodedest has enough keys to decrypt the message */
plaintext← DecT HRcvdKeys(msgFragtext)
Message has been delivered
end if
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nation of the message. While this selection technique reduces performance by potentially
sending messages from one end of the network to the other, it is necessary for security. Any
metric that would allow nodes to identify themselves as high-value midpoints would allow
adversaries to falsely identify themselves, resulting in a large number of messages routing
through compromised nodes. For this reason, midpoints are chosen randomly, rather than
using any awareness of the environment.
Consider that Alice again wants to send a message securely to Bob. Lacking the pub-
lic key, Alice encrypts the message using threshold encryption. Three keys are generated,
two of which must be possessed to read the message - enck1,k2,k3(Msg). The encrypted mes-
sage is sent to each of the three untrusted midpoints, Chuck, David, and Eric, along with a
copy of a single key encrypted with that army’s public key - encChuck(k1),enck1,k2,k3(Msg)
is sent to Chuck, and so forth. Each midpoint, upon receiving the message, should decrypt
the key, then encrypt it with Bob’s public key, and finally forward the message to Bob -
encBob(k1),enck1,k2,k3(Msg). If Chuck has been compromised, he can access a single key
that is insufficient for reading the message. This demonstrates the trade-off between se-
curity and reliability; by forcing the message to require a larger number of keys in order
to be read (such as needing three out of four created keys, for example) the algorithm is
more secure. A larger number of midpoints must be compromised by the adversary before
it is able to read the original message. This increases security at the cost of preventing the
destination from reading the message until it receives more of the keys, thus limiting both
its successful delivery ratio and its time to delivery.
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4. TIME AND ENERGY ANALYSIS
The cost of both implementing and maintaining a security infrastructure is a critical
consideration. Thus, this section contains an analysis of both the expected time required to
deliver a message and the cost of said delivery for both chained and fragmented encryption.
For comparison, an overview of the null security scheme and the key-request scheme (also
referred to as the reflection scheme) also is provided.
Although the total source-to-destination cost of a message is based on the routing al-
gorithm rather than the security system, the costs will still increase when a message must be
re-encrypted and forwarded multiple times 1. The exception to this is null security, which
will only encrypt a message if it already has the key immediately available. Otherwise, the
message will be sent in plaintext. The energy cost to transmit this message is simply the
cost required to forward a given message based on the routing protocol - E(J). Similarly,
the time required to deliver a message, T , is based solely on the routing method used -
E(T ). Both the distribution and expected values of J and T are undefined because they can
change based on the protocol used. A list of the symbols used for comparison can be found
in Table 4.1.
A major factor influencing the efficiency of a security schema is the probability that
any given node will have the public key of any other node. Such techniques as caching and
distribution can increase this probability but generally have their own security risks [16].
For the purpose of these calculations, the probability that a node will contain another node’s
key is assumed to be independent of neighboring nodes. Intelligent caching schemes, for
instance, are implemented such that if a node does not have a key, nearby nodes are more
likely to have them. Naive caching schemes tend to fill the local keyspace with the first keys
available, which means that nearby nodes likely will not have the key. As the probability
1The costs of encrypting the message are negligible compared to the transmission costs. During experi-
ments with Mica2 nodes, for example, encrypting a 1kB message required 12.96µJ. Transmitting the message
required 1.5mJ.
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of codependence is a function of the distribution and mobility schemes, for calculation
purposes they are assumed to be independent.
Table 4.1. 3PE Variable Reference Chart
Pkey Probability that a node chosen at random has the Public Key for another
node chosen at random
E(T ) Expected time for the routing algorithm to deliver a message from src
to dest
Ereq(T ) Expected time for Key Request scheme to securely deliver msg
Echain(T ) Expected time for Chaining scheme to securely deliver msg
E f rag(T ) Expected time for Fragmenting scheme to securely deliver msg
E(J) Expected energy cost for the routing algorithm to deliver a message
from src to dest
Ereq(J) Expected energy cost for Key Request scheme to deliver msg
Echain(J) Expected energy cost for Chaining scheme to deliver msg
E f rag(J) Expected energy cost for Fragmenting scheme to deliver msg
4.1. KEY REQUEST ANALYSIS
The key-request scheme begins by determining whether or not the node has the key
for the destination in question. If it does, the algorithm simply sends the encrypted message.
Otherwise, it sends a key request to the destination, along with the public key. Then, the
destination node sends an encrypted, symmetric key back to the source, where the original
message is encrypted and sent. The expected energy cost and required transmission time
therefore are based on the probability that the source already has the destination’s key,
represented as Pkey.
Ereq(J) = Pkey ∗E(J)+(1−Pkey)∗3∗E(J)
Ereq(T ) = Pkey ∗E(T )+(1−Pkey)∗3∗E(T )
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For comparison purposes, consider a large-scale environment in which nodes are
capable of carrying 30% of the total number of public keys. In such a network, 30% of the
messages will be delivered in a single origin-to-destination transmission. The other 70%
will require three such transmissions. Messages thus have an expected delay and cost of
2.4 times that of a single transmission - Ereq(J) = .3∗E(J)+ .7∗3∗E(J) = 2.4E(J).
4.2. CHAINING ANALYSIS
Similar to the key-request scheme, the chaining method begins by determining
whether or not the source has the destination’s key. If it does not, it selects k midpoints,
as described in Algorithm 21. This analysis is based on k being two nodes, although a
system with better security will have a higher k. The expected hop count is based on how
many nodes the message must visit before it is received by k nodes that have the destination
key. The probability that the hop count is equal to the probability of the source having the
key for the destination is P(HC = 1) = Pkey. For the hop count to be 3, the first node will
not have the key. Both midpoints will, however, and therefore they will not redirect the
message at all. The probability of this is P(HC = 3) = (1−Pkey)∗Pkey ∗Pkey. For the hop
count to exceed three, either of the midpoints must be forced to redirect the message. The
number of redirects is equal to the hop count minus 2, including the source’s redirect to the
two midpoints. A summary of these events can be found on Table 4.2.
The expected number of node-to-node messages can be derived when the probability
of the various hop counts is known. The expected delivery cost and time can be calculated
from the hop count.
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Src Node has Keydest E(T ) Pkey
Src does not have Keydest , both
Chosen Links have Keydest
3E(T ) PkeyP2key
Src does not have Keydest 4E(T ) Pkey ∗Pkey ∗Pkey ∗Pkey+
One link must redirect once Pkey ∗PkeyPkey ∗Pkey
= 2Pkey
2 ∗P2key
Links must redirect j times ( j+3)E(T ) Pdest
j+1P2dest




















Because the algorithm is based on a single message being forwarded through numer-
ous midpoints, both the expected delivery time and energy cost are based directly on the
hop count. For purposes of comparison, when an individual node can carry 30% of the
public keys in the network, the average hop count is 523 .
4.3. FRAGMENTED ANALYSIS
Fragmented encryption is the first algorithm discussed in which the delivery time
and the energy consumed are not directly proportional. As in the chaining algorithm, the
message routes through a set number of midpoints and continues routing until all fragments
are received. For this reason, the energy cost is nearly identical to chaining; only the
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number of fragments is different. The following equations assume that three fragments
are sent to the destination, two of which are needed to decrypt the message. In order to
send only the message through a single hop, the source node must have the destination key,
so P(HC = 1) = Pkey; otherwise, there will be at least six transmissions - the source will
send the message to each of the three midpoints, and each of those three will send it to the
destination if all three have the key - P(HC = 6) = (1−Pkey) ∗P3key. If a single midpoint
must redirect, the hop count is 7, and the probability of all three midpoints redirecting is
P(HC = 7) = 3(1−Pkey)2P3key.
P(HC = 1) = Pkey
P(HC = 6) = (1−Pkey)∗P3key
P(HC = 7) = 3(1−Pkey)2 ∗P3key




This allows us to track the total number of transmissions, which in turn is used to calculate
the total energy consumed per message.















Using the previous 30% example, this method will require each message to be trans-
mitted an expected 9.1 times before all fragments are delivered.
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Because the fragmented encryption scheme sends each message independently of the
others, the total delivery time is actually much shorter. Considering the example in which
three fragments are sent, two of which are needed to decrypt the message, the delay will be
the time the second fragment takes to reach the destination. Each fragment has a minimum
of two hops - one to reach the midpoint, and another to be forwarded to the destination.
If the fragment must be redirected to find the destination key, another hop is added. This
means that the probability of two fragments reaching the destination in two hops is the
probability of all three midpoints immediately having the key, or two of the midpoints
having the key and the third midpoint being greater. P(HC = 2) = Pkey ∗Pkey ∗Pkey +Pkey ∗
Pkey ∗ (1−Pkey). This can be expanded to show the fragment’s hop-count probability.
P(HC = i) = Pkey× (1−Pkey)i−2
P(HC > i) = (1−Pkey)i−1
P(HC < i) = 1−P(HC = i)−P(HC > i)
= 1−Pkey ∗ (1−Pkey)i−2− (1−Pkey)i−1
Calculating the hop count of the message is feasible when the individual fragment’s
hop count is known. A message will be delivered in i hops if one fragment is delivered
in exactly i hops, one fragment is delivered in i or less hops, and the third is delivered
in i or more hops (independent of order). There are four discrete possibilities: 1) All
three fragments can be delivered in exactly i hops, 2) Any one of the fragments can be
delivered in less than i hops (because it does not matter which fragment is delivered, three
combinations exist), 3) Any one can be delivered in more than i hops, and 4) One can be
delivered in less than i hops, while another is delivered in greater than i hops (likewise, this
distribution can occur in six different ways). These possible delivery hop counts, shown in
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Eqn. 2, can be used to derive the expected delivery time of the fragmented method, shown
in Eqn. 3.
P(HCmsg = i) = P(HC = i)3 +
3∗P(HC < i)∗P(HC = i)2 +
3∗P(HC = i)2 ∗P(HC > i)+
6∗P(HC < i)∗P(HC = i)∗P(HC > i)
(2)




To follow our original example, the fragmenting security scheme, with each node car-
rying 30% of the total number of keys in the system, will deliver a message in roughly 3.84
hops. This analysis confirms our earlier assertion that this scheme will deliver a message
in much less time than the chaining method, but with more energy consumption. Compar-
isons showing how the energy costs and delivery times vary with the Pkey can be found in
Figure 4.3.
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(a) Increased Energy Cost (b) Increase of Time to Deliver
Figure 4.1. Expected Performance Comparison
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5. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The purpose of 3PE techniques is to provide security in unreliable networks. In en-
vironments with either unreliable, easily-compromised communications or nodes that have
been compromised by an adversary, both chaining and fragmentation provide some mea-
sure of security, but at the cost of reduced performance and increased energy consumption.
The conditions under which 3PE fails must be determined to identify whether or not these
techniques are beneficial despite their drawbacks.
Certain assumptions were made in evaluating the system. For example, the encryp-
tion method itself was considered secure. The network uses a node identification method
that functions while the nodes are in direct contact. A certain percentage of the nodes, how-
ever, were assumed to have been compromised by an adversary. Another assumption was
that messages were compromised if they were sent without encryption, even if they did not
pass through a compromised node. However, in the simulations in Section 6, a link-layer
encryption scheme was implemented, securing messages unless they were routed through
compromised nodes.
5.1. NULL ENCRYPTION
Despite the title, the base security infrastructure will encrypt all of the messages it
can. If a node does not have the public key, it will send the message unencrypted. Due to
an adversary’s ability to eavesdrop, a message can be read any time the source key does not
have the destination key. Thus, a linear relationship exists between the number of keys a
single node possesses and the number of compromised messages (Fig. 5.1).
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(a) Message Delivery Rate (b) Compromised Message Rate
Figure 5.1. Null / Key Request Security Analysis
5.2. KEY-REQUEST SCHEME
A key-request scheme generally is broken by a man-in-the-middle attack, which is
more difficult to implement in a MANET. Because nodes are mobile, messages tend not to
follow the same message route continuously. The required position between the source and
the destination is therefore more difficult to maintain. In practice, this means that a com-
promised node must lie somewhere on the path of the original key request (so the adversary
can alter the public key), on the path of the reply containing the symmetric key (to read the
encrypted key), and on the path of the encrypted message. Because the compromised nodes
work together, message security can be violated if one node on each path is compromised.
However, if it has a dedicated communication channel, an eavesdropping adversary can re-
ply to the source node with false key information immediately upon the message being sent.
This attack renders the key-request scheme no more secure than employing no encryption
scheme at all, although the attack is more difficult to implement.
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5.3. CHAINING ANALYSIS
The major advantage of the chaining method is that all messages are encrypted in one
form or another. Eavesdropping attacks are thus rendered useless, so an adversary must rely
on compromised nodes to intercept any traffic. To determine the security of this scheme,
a Markov State process was used to simulate the current message status (Figure 5.3). A
message is sent securely from its origin to the destination only if the origin node already
possessed the key. Otherwise, the node uses the chaining algorithm, sending the message
to the first link on the chain. The first link will either be compromised by the adversary,
have the destination’s public key, or redirect the message to another link.
Figure 5.2. 2-Link Chain Process
Three possibilities exist according to how many of the two links are compromised.
If neither is compromised, the message is sent successfully to the destination. If only one
is compromised, neither the destination nor the adversary can read the result. If both are
compromised, the adversary can read the message. The probabilities of these possible
scenarios are demonstrated in Figure 5.3.
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(a) Message Delivery Rate (b) Message Failure Rate (c) Compromised Message Rate
Figure 5.3. Chaining Security Analysis
5.4. FRAGMENTED ANALYSIS
As with chaining, the adversary’s inability to eavesdrop on any traffic means that
the focus must be on compromised nodes. When using a threshold encryption scheme, an
adversary can sometimes read a message with only a portion of the traffic read. This algo-
rithm has no middle ground when using a 2 of 3 threshold encryption scheme. Eventually,
either the adversary will read the message by intercepting two of the three fragments, or
the message will be delivered successfully (Fig. 5.4).
The results of this analysis (Fig. 5.4) illustrate that both chaining and frag-
menting considerably reduce the percentage of messages compromised by the adver-
sary. In an environment in which more than half of the nodes are compromised,
neither algorithm provides enough security to operate safely. Messages can be com-
promised even when only small portions of environments are compromised. Regard-
less, both of these algorithms reduce the expected percentage of messages compro-
mised, doubling the number of messages securely transmitted in the base case in which
a given node has 30% of the keys available and 20% of the nodes have been com-
promised, though at the cost of multiplying the total energy consumed by 10 and
tripling the transmission time (refer to Figure 4.3). This increase in security is nec-
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essary in compromised environments, such as either ubiquitous or social ad hoc net-
works.
Figure 5.4. 2 of 3 Fragment Process
(a) Message Delivery Rate (b) Compromised Message Rate
Figure 5.5. Fragmented Security Analysis
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5.5. OTHER ATTACKS
A Byzantine attack [10] is when nodes are compromised and then work in collusion
to compromise security. While considered an advanced attack, other types of attacks also
are available to the adversary.
Two attacks to consider in tandem are Black Hole [17] [18] and Wormhole attacks
[19][20]. The Black Hole attack is based on nodes identifying themselves falsely as being
of high utility in order to direct all traffic through that node. Similarly, Wormhole attacks
identify themselves as having high utility. In this case, however, the utility is at least
partially correct because messages are routed with both high speed and reliability through a
dedicated channel. When applied to a routing scheme, either attack can impact the number
of messages delivered successfully. The fact that all message traffic is encrypted means
that even directing all traffic through a particular node will not allow the adversary to read
it. Incidentally, these attacks are the reason that the midpoint nodes are selected randomly.
While delivery speed and reliability may be increased by assigning a utility value to a node
(thus indicating its function as a midpoint), an adversary can use this function to route
message traffic through compromised nodes. Thus, the current 3PE model is based on
midpoints being selected randomly.
Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks are based on a midpoint intercepting a key ex-
change message and then altering that key to one that the adversary controls. When Alice
sends her public key to Bob, midpoint Eve can replace Alice’s key with her own. When
Bob uses the key, Eve can easily read all of the messages that Bob sends to Alice. Most
techniques for preventing the MitM attack are based on a trusted third party verifying the
key, which does not work in a MANET, although other techniques are designed to function
in such an environment [13] [14] [15]. Both the chaining and fragmenting algorithms are
designed to avoid this problem by only accepting keys in direct contact, thus preventing an
intermediate node from replacing the keys used.
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A final attack to consider is the Sybil attack [21], which is based on an adversary in-
jecting simulated nodes into the network. Because the algorithm selects keys from existing
nodes, a large number of false nodes increases the probability that a compromised node
will be selected as a midpoint. A review of solutions to this attack is provided by Levine et
al. [22].
In conclusion, both 3PE algorithms render the majority of network attacks useless for
the purpose of reading encrypted messages being sent across the network. While the Sybil




While all security systems have trade-offs regarding performance, the amount of per-
formance delay should be compared to the increase in performance before implementation.
For this reason, both the chaining and fragmenting algorithms were simulated using the
Omnet++ Network Simulator. Performance and security metrics were gathered and com-
pared to the null encryption scheme and the key-request scheme. When evaluating mobile
networks, the mobility patterns followed by the devices should follow realistic patterns.
The Small World in Motion mobility model [12] is a synthetic trace generator used to
match real world datasets. It assumes nodes visit locations, with the probability of visiting
a location determined by distance and popularity of the area. The performance evaluation
was simulated using control parameters set to match the Cambridge ’05 experiment.
6.1. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The algorithms were simulated in a 1000m x 1000m area, in which 100 mobile nodes
were generated. Two seperate simulations were performed. The first simulation set, de-
signed to test the concept and optimize control variables, was implemented using simple
nodes and the random waypoint mobility pattern. Each iteration varied the algorithm, the
key space, and the buffer space available on each node. A message generation schedule
was likewise generated in advance following a Gaussian distribution, with messages being
sent every 30 seconds. For message routing, a PRoPHET routing algorithm was used [23]
to route messages across the network. This routing algorithm was selected because it func-
tions well in disconnected networks, especially where the nodes have a limited range. How-
ever, the random patterns followed by nodes reduced the efficiency of PRoPHET, which
typically relies on long-term historical patterns to determine optimal paths. A summary of
this setup can be found in Table 6.1.
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The second simulation set was performed using more realistic parameters. The SWiM
trace generator was implemented to simulate human-carried devices in a large-scale area.
By measuring the social patterns, the routing algorithm PRoPHET was capable of identi-
fying reliable message routes. This resulted in greater message efficiency, allowing more
accurate measurements of the impact of the 3PE security schemata. A summary of this
setup can be found in Table 6.2.
Table 6.1. Random Waypoint Simulation Parameters
System Parameters Settings
Length x Width 1000m x 1000m
Number of Nodes 100
TX Power (tx) 0.25 mW
Signal-to-Noise Threshold (snr) 3.98∗10−9
Carrier Frequency (cf) 2.4∗109 Hz
Transmission range between nodes 53m
Message Generation Rate 30 sec mean
Mobility Pattern Random Waypoint





6.2.1. Simulation Attack Model. The potential attacker’s capabilities are a primary
factor when evaluating a security system. MANET uses radio communications, which al-
low attackers to eavesdrop on all unencrypted traffic. The simulation assumes that nodes
use link-layer security, meaning that all traffic is encrypted. Breaking message encryption
is not considered feasible. Adversaries can, however, inject themselves into the network,
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Table 6.2. SWiM Simulation Parameters
PRoPHET Settings
α Direct Contact Impact Setting .007
β Inirect Contact Impact Setting .008
γ Probability Decay Rate .9992
SWiM Control Settings
Wait Time Exponent Exponent of the power-law of the waiting time dis-
tribution
1.35
Wait Time Upper Bound Upper bound of the waiting time distribution 12h
α Distribution of home nodes .75
Buckets per Side Bucket number per network area side (Used for
performance improvements)
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disguising themselves as normal nodes. The simulation is based on the adversary com-
promising a certain percentage of the nodes. These nodes can read and modify any un-
encrypted messages going through them but are unable to break any encryption scheme
used.
6.2.2. Random Waypoint Simulation Results. Based on the analysis described
above, the chaining method was expected to be the most secure, but at the cost of reduced
performance, both in terms of the ratio of messages successfully delivered and the delivery
time.
For general comparison, all algorithms were submitted multiple times using a fi-
nite buffer from 10 to 1000 messages. The keychain also varied, holding from 10%
to 100% of the available keys in the network. The chaining algorithm varied the num-
ber of required links from 2 to 5. Likewise, the fragmented algorithm varied both the
number of fragments sent and the number needed for decryption from 2 to 5. Due to
limited space, full results are shown for runs with buffers capable of carrying 400 mes-
sages, and 20% of the node keys are displayed. The chaining algorithm results for
two links are shown, as are the fragmenting results for sending three fragments, two of
which are required to decrypt the message. The results (shown in Figure 6.2.2) match
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the expected results; 3PE algorithms offer much better security but at a greatly increased
cost.
(a) Energy Costs and Delivery
Ratio
(b) Security Analysis (c) Message Delivery Time
Analysis
Figure 6.1. Simulation Results, 400 message buffer, 20% of keys
One valuable trait of the 3PE methods is that they are scalable. Security can be in-
creased to suit compromised networks, though at a higher cost. The simulation (Figure
6.2.2) shows that increasing the number of midpoints increases security at a faster rate than
the performance degrades. Scaling the system up has drawbacks, including higher trans-
mission costs and longer delivery times. In theory, however, the security can be improved
indefinitely.
Similar experiments were run for the fragmented method with various numbers of
fragments. The results are complicated by the extra variable. The overview in Figure 6.2.2
shows that performance varies in the same manner as in chaining, but much faster. The
performance starts off slightly worse than in chaining and then drops quickly. The security,
however, improves just as quickly. For comparison, when chaining into 5 links, the delivery
ratio is 16%, with 1% of the messages being compromised. A comparable delivery ratio can
be found when fragmenting to 3 messages, in which the compromised ratio is 2.6%. In the
same environments, by fragmenting into 5 messages (all of which are needed), the delivery
ratio is 14%, but 0.1% of the messages are compromised. This indicates that, while the
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fragmented algorithm is more flexible, accomodating a wider range of environments with
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Figure 6.2. Results of Varying Fragment Count
For general comparison, all algorithms were submitted multiple times using a finite
buffer from 10 to 1000 messages, and capable of holding from 10% to 100% of the available
keys in the network. The Chaining algorithm varied the number of links needed from 2 to 5.
Likewise, the Fragmented algorithm was submitted varying both the number of fragments
sent and the number needed for decryption, ignoring those in which the number required to
decrypt was larger than the number sent. Due to limited space available, full results were
shown for runs with buffers capable of carrying 400 messages and 20% of the node keys
were displayed, with the number of links used in the Chaining algorithm was set to 2, and
the Fragmenting algorithm sending 3 fragments, requiring 2 to decrypt the message. The
results, shown in Figure 6.2.2, match the expected results - much larger costs, much better
security for the 3PE algorithms.
One valuable trait regarding the 3PE methods is that they are scalable, able to increase
security at a higher cost. By increasing the number of midpoints, the simulation shows
(Figure 6.2.2) that security increases at a faster rate than the performance degrades. Scaling
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the system up has other drawbacks, such as higher transmission costs and longer delivery
time, but in theory the security can be improved indefinitely.
Figure 6.3. Results of Varying Link Count
6.2.3. Small World in Motion Simulation Results. The second set of simulations
allowed more accurate measurements of the performance considerations in a realistic en-
vironment. The results, show in Figure 6.2.3, indicate that changing the mobility pattern
allowed much more reliability and improved security in the environments. This indicates
that the 3PE security overlay networks are susceptible to a disruptive environment. The
Fragmenting algorithm performed very well in this environment, only exceeding the Chain-
ing algorithm’s security when more than half of the network was compromised. Based on
these results, the Fragmenting algorithm is more secure and better performing except at
very insecure networks.
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(a) Simulated Performance (b) Simulated Security
Figure 6.4. Results of SWiM Experiments
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7. CONCLUSION
Both the experimental results and the analytical models indicate that 3PE algorithms
can improve the security in an otherwise unsecured network at the cost of increased net-
work traffic and slower performance. While exact numbers vary based on both the network
environment and the degree of security needed, results suggest that 3PE algorithms serve
as secure methods for routing without public keys. Additionally, both 3PE schemes can be
implemented without prior knowledge or trust schemes. They can be fine tuned to the de-
gree of performance and security required by increasing the number of links or fragments.
While the chaining system boasts higher security and lower system costs, fragmenting has a
faster delivery time and can be modified more easily to suit a wider range of environments.
An ongoing issue to be addressed is the integration of 3PE methods with a proper key
management system. Because key management systems can use a variety of trust models to
indicate the security of the individual key, a feasible approach is to merge the two, using key
management when trust exceeds a certain threshold, and using a 3PE method otherwise. In
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V. Content Distribution in Delay-Tolerant Networks using Social Context
Roy Cabaniss and Sanjay Madria
Department of Computer Science,
Missouri University of Science and Technology, Rolla, Missouri 65401
Wireless communication technologies have given rise to the development of Delay
Tolerant Networks, a collection of devices which route data opportunistically. These net-
works can be used to distribute data, such as news articles, advertisements, or media, to
interested clients. To deliver content efficiently, the Social Content Distribution (SCD)
schema collects social context data and request patterns. Nodes are then designated as
mobile repositories, or throwboxes, at which large content stores are kept. Clients request
specific articles from nearby repositories. By predicting which nodes request data, based
on request and social patterns, the SCD schema services content requests quickly and effi-
ciently. Applying the SCD protocol to a simulated environment of social entities resulted




Wireless ad-hoc networks are a developing field in which devices exchange infor-
mation and resources to perform tasks beyond their individual capabilities. These tasks
can include large-scale computing, message delivery, navigation, or sharing sensory data.
Many such networks are examples of Delay-Tolerant Networks (DTNs). Devices in these
architectures store messages in their buffer to be forwarded to the destination as opportuni-
ties for routing occur. One task applicable to DTNs is that of efficient content distribution.
Content distribution is defined as the task of providing requested data to the clients.
Requests are constructed by the client and transmitted to a node capable of servicing them,
usually a server or repository. This is different from caching in the distribution of the
content requested. Caching is used ideally to provide the same data item to a large number
of clients, which means having individual nodes keep a copy of the data item allows them
to serve requests just as well as the server[1]. If the content repository contains a large
number of related data items that are requested individually, caching a particular data item
will only allow the node to serve that specific data item. A mobile repository, sometimes
called a data store or a throwbox, contains a large collection of related items which allow
the device to serve the majority of requests.
An example execution is a mobile advertisement server. Since each consumer is
interested in a different set of articles, caching is of limited benefit. Although a node can
cache several items, it is unlikely that nodes it encounters will be interested in that specific
advertisement. However, if a node can act as a throwbox containing a collection of adver-
tisements it can respond to requests, reducing average access time. Clients in the shopping
environment send a request to the nearest throwbox, including any patterns they wish to
share, and the throwbox can process it without waiting for the request to be processed by
the main server. Other use cases include media files, navigation data, or a news site.
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In the area of delay tolerant networks, social context can be used to improve the ef-
ficiency of certain tasks such as routing or caching. Clients tend to be influenced by social
patterns regarding their content requests [2]. In general, if the client’s contacts request a
specific data item, the probability of that client requesting it are increased. To take ad-
vantage of this tendency a node must first identify the consistent contacts of a node. In a
dynamic environment, in which nodes are added and removed, the social structure must
accommodate such changes.
The purpose of the Social Content Distribution schema is to locate the optimal posi-
tion for mobile repositories. This is accomplished by evaluating the existing social struc-
ture of the network, identifying which nodes and groups issue frequent content requests,
and locating the devices most capable of fulfilling these requests. Initially, a node identifies
its frequent contacts, forming small groups. These groups are merged, joined and left by
nodes to accurately reflect the network’s social structure. Simultaneously, nodes track the
request frequency of themselves and their groups. This data is reviewed to determine a
metric for the benefit of positioning a throwbox at that node. The end result is to position
repositories in close proximity to requests, increasing content availability and reducing the
average round-about time.
1.1. RELATED WORK
1.1.1. Bubble Rap. The Bubble-Rap grouping method [3] al-
locates nodes into groups based on direct contacts. They distribute using a
method called k − cliques, in which all fully connected groups of k mem-
bers are considered a distinct group. They are then merged with all other
k − cliques which share k − 1 members. This provides an accurate rep-
resentation of the groups formed by a set of nodes. However, it relies
on global knowledge of the nodes’ contacts, and it must have them before
the algorithm can group them. As such, it cannot be used in an on-
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going DTN, although it provides a valuable tool for analysis and compari-
son.
1.1.2. R-P2P. Another system designed to allocate data through a delay tolerant
network is the R-P2P system [4]. It is designed to ensure content, such as advertising or
media content, is consistently available to a client. This is performed by designating certain
nodes in the environment as throwboxes, responsible for serving data queries and maintain-
ing updated content. Throwboxes maintain a Distributed Hash Table among themselves,
enabling them to locate data without storing is directly. When a client requests a data item,
it contacts the nearest throwbox. The distributed hash table is consulted to determine which
throwbox contains the data item in particular, then dedicated communication channels ob-
tain the item. The use of throwboxes in the DTN is a valuable contribution to the field of
content distribution, which the SCD algorithm utilizes along with a social aspect.
1.1.3. OnMove. An earlier attempt to position throwboxes in a DTN uses social
context, among other metrics. The OnMove protocol [5] is designed to determine which
nodes are ideal for distributing content based on a series of parameters. By calculating the
repository rank of a node based on social similarity, meeting frequency, connection quality,
content similarity, and ’betweenness’ to other nodes, the protocol can establish ranking
metric. While the overview is promising, the complete protocol was never developed. The
SCD algorithm expands on this concept, applying the social context of nodes to identify




All nodes in a mobile ad hoc network are aware of their immediate surroundings,
including neighboring nodes, via wireless communications. A social group, in this context,
is a collection of nodes which have regular contact with each other. Nodes of a social group
maintain group data, including group membership and the metrics of all group members.
By tracking the contact patterns of a node it is possible to extrapolate the social patterns
a node follows. Node’s maintain their group list in three ways. When two nodes have
regular contact with each other, they form a new social group. Two social groups with
similar members can merge. Finally, nodes can resign from groups which they no longer
participate in.
2.1.1. Forming Groups. To determine any groups formed by nodes, the first step
is to establish a metric by which the distance between two nodes can be measured. The
SCD schema calculates the percent of time spent in direct contact, using an exponential
moving average formula to adjust the current estimate. Initially the direct contact strength,
λA,B is set to 0 between all nodes. Whenever nodes enter contact, nodes measure how long
they have spent in and out of contact. This data is used to calculate λA,B as the estimated
percent of time the nodes spend in contact. As an exponential moving average, it is based
on historical data, with a higher emphasis placed on more recent data. The control variable
α determines how quickly the contact strength changes, as shown in eq. 1. A higher α will
result in more emphasis being placed in recent changes, allowing nodes to swiftly adapt
but also be fooled or confused by brief changes.
λA,B = (1−α)λA,B +α timecontacttimecontact + timenocontact (1)
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Although λA,B measures the direct contacts of a node fairly well, it tends not to ac-
commodate indirect contacts. Indirect contacts, also called transitive contacts, indicate a
node’s ability to communicate to another node via intermediate nodes. Although NodeA
may only occasionally encounter NodeB, if it constantly encounters other nodes which have
high connection to NodeB there is still a high level of association. The control variable β
is used to determine the impact of transitive contacts to a node. With this a cumulative
estimate of the contact strength, CSA,B, is calculated and compared to a group formation
threshold, ψ. When the contact strength exceeds a control threshold ψ, this indicates the
nodes are considered close enough to form a new group. The updates to λ and forming new
groups are detailed in Algorithm 23.
Algorithm 23 Forming New Groups
Notation
NodeA, NodeB - Active nodes in the network
λA,B - Direct contact strength between NodeA and NodeB
CSA,B - Cumulative contact strength between NodeA and NodeB
α - Control variable, rate of direct contact change
β - Control variable, impact of transitive contacts
ψ - Threshold for forming a new group
Trigger - NodeA contacts NodeB
λA,B = (1−α)λA,B +α timecontacttimecontact+timenocontact
CSA,B = λA,B +(1−λA,B)×β×∏NodeB λA,C×λC,B
if CSA,B > ψ then
Form new GroupY , consisting of NodeA and NodeB
end if
Since groups will change as time passes, through group merges or resignations, dis-
tributing the group data through all the participating nodes is difficult. Attempts to allow
any node in the group to make changes resulted in data fragmentation, which is when
two nodes of the same group had different group data. To avoid this, one of the nodes
is arbitrarily selected as the group head. The group head also maintains data on member
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nodes, specifically their relative connection strengths. This data is used to validate group
merges.
2.1.2. Merging Groups. By tracking the contact strength between nodes, a series
of two-node social groups can be formed. The next step is to integrate these links into
larger groups by merging similar groups. Nodes which are joint members of two groups
will periodically review the group data for merges. Although further checks will occur at
the group head, the joint member’s only concern is group similarity, which is defined as the
ratio of joint group to the union of the two groups - |GroupY∩GroupZ ||GroupY∪GroupZ | . The control variable τ
determines what percentage of nodes must be in both groups. If the joint node determines
the two groups are similar enough, then a SUGGEST message is sent to the group head
of the smaller of the two groups. This message indicates that the node believes there is a
potential group merge available.
When the group head receives the suggestion, it confirms that the two groups are
similar. It then performs a check to ensure that it has enough contact strength with the
new group; if the group head’s average CS to the merged group is below ψ, it will discard
the suggestion. Otherwise, an INV IT E message is generated and sent to the other group
head. This message indicates that one of the groups has already approved the merger, and
the other group must still approve the merge. The other group head confirms the similarity
and contact strength as well. At this point, both group heads have confirmed that the two
groups should be merged. A KILL message is sent to all members of the smaller group,
and all members are added to the larger group. The process is detailed in Algorithm 24.
Performing merges in this manner updates groups in a limited environment. It has
the drawback in that it does not ensure all nodes of the group are strongly connected to all
members of the new group. To address this issue, nodes can resign from groups they no
longer have a strong attachment to.
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Algorithm 24 Merging Groups
Notation
GroupY , GroupZ - Social groups in DTN
NodeA - Member of both GroupY and GroupZ
NodeB - Group head of GroupY
NodeC - Group Head of GroupZ
τ - Threshold for Merging a Group
ψ - Grouping Threshold
Trigger - Periodically in NodeA




|GroupY ⋃GroupZ | > τ then
Send SUGGEST Message to Group Head (NodeB)
end if
end for




|GroupY ⋃GroupZ | > τ then
Calculate average CSB,GroupZ∪GroupY
if Avg(CSB,GroupZ∪GroupY )> ψ then
Send INV IT E Message to Group Head NodeC
end if
end if





|GroupY ⋃GroupZ | > τ then
Calculate average CSB,GroupZ∪GroupY




Send KILLY Message to all members of GroupY
end if
end if
If both Group Heads approve, one group is added to the other and then removed
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2.1.3. Resignation. Periodically nodes will review their group list to ensure they
are still participating, as shown in Algorithm 25. The average contact strength to all group
members is calculated, and if it is beneath ψ the node resigns from the group. A RESIGN
message is sent to the group head which requests that this node be removed from the group
data. To avoid fragmentation, the sending node will not remove group data until the mes-
sage has been confirmed. This stage limits the groups size, and ensures members of a group
are still regularly encountering other members.
Algorithm 25 Resigning from a Group
Notation
NodeA - Active node in the network
GroupY - Group containing NodeA
NodeB - Head of GroupY
ψ - Group Threshold
Trigger - Periodically in NodeA
sumCS = 0
for all NodeB ∈ GroupY do
sumCS = sumCS+CSA,B
end for
AvgCSA,Y = sumCS|GroupY |
if CSA,Y < ψ then
Send RESIGNA,Y to NodeB
end if
2.2. CONTENT REPOSITORY POSITIONING
2.2.1. Request Frequency. To determine the optimal position for a repository,
it is necessary to measure which nodes are requesting data items frequently. The request
score for NodeA, µA, is an exponential moving average which estimates the time between
requests. Whenever a node makes a user request the update process estimates the average
time between requests based on the previous estimate and the control variable φ, which
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determines how much emphasis is placed on historical data. This process allows nodes to
maintain an up-to-date estimate, adjusting to reflect the node’s request patterns.
µA = (1−φ)µA +φ(timecurrent− timeprev) (2)
2.2.2. Group Request Score. The SCD schema augments repository selection
by considering the social aspects of the nodes. The ranking of a node depends on its own
ability to deliver a content item to requesting nodes and the ability of its contacts. Having
identified the social groups in Section 2.1, a node can calculate its Request with Group
Score (RGS). This is considered as the time for NodeA or a neighboring node to request a
data item.
Traffic requests tend to follow a Markov-Poisson process [6]. As such, the time be-
tween a node’s estimated requests follow exponential distribution. This allows the schema
to estimate the minimum of any set of node requests as the sum of the λ of these distribu-
tions (not related to the contact strength between nodes in 2.1). The λ of the distributions
is the inverse of the average time between contacts, 1µA . Thus, for group GY an estimate of







The Spread control variable is an estimate of how likely a client’s request patterns
are influenced by their social groups. This tends to vary based on the type of content
- while close friends may watch similar videos, program update requests are not based
on a contact’s programs. This control variable allows different amounts of emphasis to
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be placed on the social aspects of the content. These variables are used to calculate the







2.2.3. Repository Position Ranking. At this stage of the process, nodes are aware
of the frequency with which they contact other nodes (λA,B) and how often these nodes
will request content, either on their own behalf or that of neighbors (RSGA). The ranking
algorithm establishes a metric, Rank Position Score (RPSA) as the sum of other node’s




Whenever a node which contains a repository, NodeA, encounters NodeB, both calcu-
late their respective RPS. If RPSB is greater than RPSA, this indicates that NodeB is closer
to more frequently requesting nodes than NodeA. A message updating the data owner is
sent, and the entire repository is shifted. As this is a high-bandwidth operation, it is only
performed if RPSB exceeds RPSA by a certain threshold.
For reference, a summary of the control variables and metrics used has been provided
in Table 2.1. The ideal control variables were identified through experimentation, submit-
ting repeatedly under baseline conditions before implementing experimental algorithms.
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α Contact Strength Change Rate 0 - 1.0 0.4
β Transitive Contact Impact 0 - 1.0 0.7
ψ Group Formation Threshold 0 - 1.0 .2
φ Request Strength Change Rate 0 - 1.0 0.85
Spread Impact of group on node 0 - 0.1 .05
Ideal values tested by experimentation
Variables
λA,B Direct Contact Strength between nodes
CSA,B Contact Strength between nodes, including transitive con-
tacts
µA Estimated request frequency of NodeA
µGroupY Estimated request frequency of GroupY




To determine the performance of the SCD schema the schema was implemented in
The One DTN simulation environment[7]. This tool, originally written in Java, is designed
to realistically implement traits such as buffer overflow, transmission speeds, and disruption
(Table 3.1). The analysis was generated using 120 mobile nodes using Bluetooth to com-
municate. Nodes used the Dynamic Social Grouping routing algorithm, which functions
well in social, largely disconnected environments [8].








To simulate a schema which relies on the social aspects of mobile nodes, the mo-
bility patterns must incorporate social dynamics. For this reason a series of patterns were
generated using the Small World in Motion (SWiM) algorithm, which is based on nodes
repeatedly revisiting either locations that have meaning to them as individuals (house, lab),
or locations where they see a large number of other nodes (restaurant, park)[9]. The time
these nodes remain at a given location follows a power law distribution with a set upper
limit. Another variable, α, determines how the nodes’ home points are distributed. An
α of 0 represents uniform distribution, while 1 indicates all nodes have the same home.
These variables can be tuned to match sets of real world data. A control parameter set was
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generated to match the Cambridge dataset (Table 3.2), which is a real-world collection of
Bluetooth contacts [10]. The SWiM tool created 120 nodes and deployed them in a 1km by
1km area without features. Using the control parameters to match the Cambridge dataset, a
period of 1 month was randomly generated 20 times. The result was several sets of mobility
patterns, each modelling human behaviour.
Table 3.2. SWiM Cambridge Control Variables
Nodes 120
Wait Time Exponent Exponent of the power-law of the
waiting time distribution
1.35
Wait Time Upper Bound Upper bound of the waiting time
distribution
12h
α Distribution of home nodes .75
Buckets per Side Bucket number per network area




Message traffic was generated using a Poisson process in which each node has a dif-
ferent interest level. The interest level was generated to average at a user requesting a data
item per hour, with a variance of 12 hours. Afterwards, the tendency of a social group
to influence interest was considered. The mobility data was reviewed to determine which
nodes spent over 2% of their time in another node’s company (a sample linkage display
is shown in Figure 3.1(a), figure produced by SocNetV[11]). A MATLAB script was im-
plemented to review the links, generating a series of groups using the k-clique grouping
algorithm for analysis (Figure 3.1(b)). After the cliques were prepared, the participating
nodes’ interest levels were adjusted towards the group average. The result was a series of
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contact request patterns in which nodes would request data based on individual interest and
group tendencies.
(a) Connectivity Display (b) k− clique Display
Figure 3.1. Sample Network Layout
3.3. COMPARISON
The results of the SCD schema were compared against two baselines. The first is
the Static Repository, which has no mobile throwboxes. Instead, one node acts as the
server. This baseline has the advantage of no update cost, since the server node is also the
one generating all updates. However, all requests are sent to the server, and the server’s
location in the DTN is randomly selected, resulting in poor performance. In contrast, the
Wandering Datastore baseline has multiple repositories that transfer themselves randomly.
On each contact, a throwbox has a set probability, p, to transfer to the neighboring node.
A range of probabilities were simulated, resulting in the better performance with p = .05.
This method has a tendency to spread datastores throughout the network, allowing them
to service the whole environment. By positioning randomly, however, it does not take
advantage of any context data, and thus performs poorly.
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3.4. RESULTS
The simulation results indicated that applying social context to the task of throw-
box positioning improves the performance considerable. The delivery ratio shows a 21%
improvement, and the delivery time is reduced to 30%, as shown in Figure 3.4. This perfor-
mance increase has a trade-off, however, of higher costs to update the repositories (Figure
3.3). A static repository (which remains on a single device) can be updated at no cost,
since all the requests come to the device. In contrast, allowing nodes to place themselves
optimally requires the various repositories be updated by sending file updates through the
network. As the simulation uses a sparse DTN of relatively low mobility (see section 3.1),
this is a significant delay, taking between 6 to 10 hours. This delay is acceptable to some
applications (such as advertisement or navigation data), but other applications require up-
dates be implemented much more quickly (such as a news site).
In addition to the update delay, the throwbox must also deploy itself to the optimal
position. On contact, a repository will transfer, or shift, when the RPS of the contact
exceeds the current node’s ranking. Considering that the content repository can range from
large to very large, the costs of such transmissions are considerable. A single throwbox
must reposition itself on average once every day to maintain the optimal position, as shown
in Figure 3.3(b). Even a large repository (500Mb) can position itself optimally by using 4J
of energy per day (based on the 100nJ per bit cost [12]).
(a) Content Delivery Ratio (b) Content Delivery Time (c) Content HopCount
Figure 3.2. Request Performance
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(a) Update Delivery Time (b) Number of Repository Shifts
Figure 3.3. Repository Maintenance
Allocating additional throwboxes apparently had very limited benefit to the algo-
rithm. Although both delivery ratio and time-to-delivery improved with added repositories,
the performance increase was marginal. This is possibly due to the tendency of throwboxes
to find the optimal position independent of the activity of other throwboxes. Although
there is a mechanism to prevent them from inhabiting the same device, all throwboxes will
identify the most heavily trafficked network area and position themselves in the same re-
gion. Future experiments should be considered to implement a repulsion element to the
throwboxes, ensuring they maintain a reasonable distance from each other.
3.5. TEST CASE
To determine the benefit of the SCD algorithm, consider an application which dis-
tributes music samples. The mobile repository contains a sample of every music the store
has for sale, and clients will send requests for specific songs. If the store is using itself as
the sole source, it acts as a static repository. Based on the simulations, clients who request
a song will have to wait an average of 5 hours to receive the song. Assuming the song is
3Mb, it will also require 131mJ to deliver from the entire network. Since a sample smart-
phone battery contains 3284J of energy [13], this number is fairly low, although high traffic
from other nodes can still drain the battery life.
160
In contrast, the store may request customers use an app implementing the SCD al-
gorithm. If so, a clients song request time will drop from 5 hours to 1 hour and 30 min.
This is still much slower than downloading from the 3G network, which can perform a
3MB download in roughly 60 seconds. However, the energy consumption (not to mention
bandwidth allocation) is much cheaper using SCD. The 3G environment requires 20J to
download a 100kB file, so the 3MB song will require an estimated 2000J to obtain[13]. In
contrast, the SCD schema will require only 130mJ, even if only a single repository is used.
Increasing the number of repositories can reduce this to 126mJ.
There are also maintenance costs to consider. Each repository will shift position
roughly once per day. Assuming the repository contains 200 songs, this means the cost per
day is 4.2J. Furthermore, when the server wants to update the song selection it must send an
update to each throwbox. Since the average hopcount for updates is 9.13, this means that
sending one song to one throwbox will consume an additional 29mJ, and will take roughly
6 hours and 40 minutes to implement.
The above analysis demonstrates SCD schema provides much faster access to data
than a static and randomly selected repository although it requires some energy to maintain
the throwboxes. It is much cheaper than using the 3G network to download the song, both
in terms of bandwidth and energy consumption.
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4. CONCLUSIONS
By taking advantage of the social context of a network, several of the network ca-
pabilities can be augmented. With the full range of social dynamics yet to be explored,
applications can be developed to take advantage of the additional information, as well as
developing algorithms to identify social patterns. This paper presents one such social al-
gorithm, identifying groups dynamically by measuring the contact intervals. It then uses
this data to accurately identify which nodes are optimal positions for mobile repositories.
Future considerations can include further optimizing the social group detection algorithm.
Identifying links between nodes based on common request patterns, for instance, may be
used to establish which nodes are contacts and which are friends. This in turn can be used
to augment grouping by distinguishing between common contacts and common interests.
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This document presents a series of algorithms for efficient routing in a Delay Toler-
ant Network based on the social dynamics of the mobile nodes. It also presents algorithms
enabling secure communications when the source does not have access to a destination’s
public key. Finally, it applies social context to the problem of optimal mobile repository se-
lection, allowing content to be placed in the network such that it can be distributed quickly
and efficiently.
The Dynamic Social Grouping algorithm is designed for efficient node-to-basestation
routing. The group identification method based upon contact patterns was introduced. The
group data was used to augment the probabilistic scheme. By combining a node’s group
data with individual probability, the algorithm could accurately estimate a node’s chance
of successful message delivery based on previous message performance. A simulation
using real-world data from an IEEE conference showed a significant improvement over the
Epidemic and Probabilistic routing algorithms.
The Dynamic Social Grouping - Node to Node algorithm is an expansion of the DSG
routing algorithm. Using a similar method to identify the social groups of the environ-
ment, the routing method was expanded to deliver to any node in the network. Further
experiments were performed using different methods to route through known groups. The
routing could be based on the node’s performance with previous messages (Performance
Based Probability), or it could be based on contact frequency, both direct and indirect
(Contact Based Probability). Further, the Hybrid algorithm could ignore probability within
a group, routing epidemically through the destination’s social groups. These algorithms
were tested using the MIT Reality Project dataset, which collected contact and message
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data about students over the course of 9 months, resulting in long-term views of the social
patterns.
There are two Three Point Encryption algorithms designed to send a message pri-
vately in a DTN when the source node does not have the destination’s public key. The
Chaining method selects other nodes for which it does possess the key, then encrypts the
message for both using a commutative encryption algorithm. Each midpoint, upon receiv-
ing the message, will remove their layer of encryption and then encrypt it for the final
destination. This algorithm is the more secure of the two at a penalty to delivery ratio and
time. To reduce the impact, the Fragmenting method was implemented. This algorithm
encrypts the message using a threshold encryption technique and then sends each fragment
of the key through a different midpoint. Since threshold encryption can be decrypted by a
subset of the keys, the final destination can decrypt the original message even if fragments
were intercepted or dropped. This algorithm has a much faster speed and better delivery
ratio, but the adversary can break the security more often. Both of these algorithms were
tested in a highly compromised DTN, and showed that they reduced the probability of a
message being compromised considerably, with a trade-off of reduced delivery ratio and
increased delivery time.
The selection of mobile repository location in a DTN can be improved by a schema
which incorporates social context. While nodes can cache data items they encounter, sev-
eral applications are too large to efficiently store in a single node. Further, in certain ap-
plications nodes are unlikely to request a data item multiple times, which renders caching
nearly useless. Distributing repositories throughout the network can improve access time,
and this can be further improved by selecting their location intelligently. By identifying
groups and matching their interests, both as a group and as an individual node, a mobile
repository can preemptively position data to serve client requests, consuming less band-
width and improving access time.
166
VITA
Roy Cabaniss was born in Georgia of the United States of America. He earned his
Bachelors of Science undergraduate degree from the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville,
majoring in Computer Science. After his graduation, he become a Programmer, then Ad-
vanced Programmer for Wal-Mart ISD in the Replenishment Division. His responsibilities
involved updating the Two-Tier Replenishment systems, upgrading buffer pull systems,
and monitoring the background processes that order supplies for the stores.
Roy was accepted at the Missouri University of Science and Technology in 2008,
where he earned his Doctorate of Philosophy in May, 2013. While there he served as a
research assistant for Dr. Sanjay Madria, focusing in the areas of routing and security in
Delay Tolerant Networks and Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks. He served as a teaching assistant
for the Introduction to C++ classes, both the lab and the lecture, and mentored summer
workshops teaching wireless sensor systems to undergraduate students.

